Natural Law as Practical Methodology: A Finnisian Analysis of City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co. by Barnhizer, David
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1990
Natural Law as Practical Methodology: A Finnisian
Analysis of City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co.
David Barnhizer
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Legal History Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Barnhizer, Natural Law as Practical Methodology: A Finnisian Analysis of City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co., 38 Clev. St. L. Rev.
15 (1990)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/5
NATURAL LAW AS PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY:
A FINNISIAN ANALYSIS OF CITY OF RICHMOND v. J. A. CROSON,
CO.
DAVID BARNHIZER*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................. 15
A. The Structure and Focus of This Article ................. 18
B. The Idea of Authentic Practical Judgment ............... 20
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FINNIS'S THEORY ........................... 23
A. A "Soft" Theory of Natural Law .......................... 23
B. The Functions of Natural Law ............................ 24
C. A Modern, Complex Form of Natural Law ............... 31
D. A Finnisian Account of Human Nature: Valuing Life
and Judicial Instantiation of Basic Human Goods ..... 32
III. SOME METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
FINNIs's THEORY ................................................ 36
A. A Methodology of Substantive Categories of Thought.. 36
B. Judicial Conservatism and Finnis's
Theme of Harmony ......................................... 38
C. The Limits of Judicial Choice ............................. 40
D. Hard Choices and Incommensurable Goods ............. 41
E. Finnisian Algorithms and Judicial Choice .............. 43
IV. AN APPLICATION OF FINNIs's THEORY OF NATURAL LAW .. 45
A. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co ..................... 45
B. American Apartheid ........................................ 45
C. Background Information on Croson ...................... 47
D. The Incommensurable Values of Croson ................. 51
E. Justice O'Connor's Analysis ............................... 52
F. Equality, Human Flourishing, and Distributive Justice 57
V . CONCLUSION ..................................................... 59
A. The Utility of Finnis's Theory ............................. 59
B. A Critique of Justice O'Connor's Opinion ................ 61
I. INTRODUCTION
Natural law generates visions of just political orders. John Finnis pro-
vided such a vision in Natural Law and Natural Rights,1 one that he
continues in this Symposium's centerpiece essay, "Natural Law and Legal
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Uni-
versity. A.B., Muskingum College; J.D., Ohio State University; L.L.M., Harvard
University.
I J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) [hereinafter FINNIS].
See also Grisez, Boyle, & Finnis, Practical Principle, Moral Truth, and Ultimate
Ends, 32 AM. J. Jums. 94 (1987). The article contains a selected bibliography.
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Reasoning."2 In his essay, Finnis constructs a theory of human nature
and legal reasoning, seeking to demonstrate how a practical, human-
centered theory of natural law oriented to the value of life and basic
human goods and in which principles emanate from "natural" human
characteristics, can clarify basic reasons for judicial choice.3 In doing so,
Finnis offers important elements for the development of a practical meth-
odology of natural law, one potentially useful for understanding the
deeper nature of what judges do in making specific choices in hard cases. 4
Linked concepts of nature and human nature have always been integral
elements of natural law, although the concepts reflect nothing more than
hypotheses. Dennis Lloyd remarks, for example, that the essence of nat-
ural law may be said to lie in "the constant assertion that there are
objective moral principles which depend upon the nature of the universe
and which can be discovered by reason... [and that] the rules governing
correct human conduct are logically connected with imminent truths con-
cerning human nature."' d'Entreves has observed, however, that "many
of the ambiguities of the concept of natural law must be ascribed to the
ambiguity of the concept of nature that underlies it." '6
It has nearly always been assumed within the various theories of nat-
ural law that the universe is somehow elementally and morally linked
with humans and that humans possess the ability, or at least the potential
ability, to join harmoniously with the universal force or being.7 The fac-
2 Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Natural Law]. Practical reason and practical wisdom are intimately
linked with experience and judgmental maturity more than the exercise of spec-
ulative or mathematical thought. Aristotle comments: "[W]hile young men be-
come geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is
thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that
such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which
become familiar from experience..." ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk.
VI, ch. 8, (R. McKeon ed. 1973) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE].
3 Natural Law, supra note 2. Finnis offers what can become a shared language
of natural law. A shared language is an increasingly vital need.
4 Natural law, like wisdom, has had many meanings. Eugene Rice's description
of the changing content of our concepts of wisdom are equally applicable to how
we have thought about natural law.[I]f the various definitions of wisdom invented by the Greek philos-
ophers remained virtually intact from Plato's Phaedrus and Aristotle's
Metaphysics to the De la Sagesse of Charron, their meanings changed
profoundly. ... It [wisdom] mirrored man's conception of himself, of
the world, and of God. [Sluch an idea is inevitably a continual repe-
netration of traditional formulas with new values and new assump-
tions. Word and definition remain static; the idea itself is transformed
by the changing needs and aspirations of successive epochs, centuries,
and even generations.
E. RICE, JR., THE RENAISSANCE IDEA OF WISDOM 2 (1958).
" LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO
JURISPRUDENCE FIFTH EDITION 93 (1985) [hereinafter LORD LLOYD]. Finnis con-
tinues this tradition, at least as to the existence of some objective moral criteria
discoverable by the application of a richer form of practical reason. "Natural Law
and Legal Reasoning" at 19.6A.P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 16 (Rev. ed. 1970).
7 See, e.g., A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY, (Abr.Ed. 1957) [hereinafter TOYN-
BEE], referring to the dominance of Greek ideas of rationalism and their influence
on Western intellectual structures through the Catholic Church's extreme con-
centration on Aristotle.
[Vol. 38:15
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ulty or mechanism of reason has been the predominant qualitative power
that connects humans to the hypothesized universal "field" of values,
morality, reason, or God.8 These assumptions are anthropocentrically re-
ligious in nature, have never been proven as opposed to asserted, yet rest
at the base of virtually all of the Western intellectual system including
all of natural law, even Finnis's "practical" version.9
Finnis begins "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning" by asserting that,
"[a] natural law theory is nothing other than a theory of good reasons
for choice (and action)."' 0 This represents a shift from a post-Aquinian
Scholastic and rationalist view of an authoritative core of singular reasons
for action (or inaction) derived from sources external to humans, and to
which presumptively inferior humanity was subject, and both transforms
the nature of natural law and returns it in some ways to its pre-Cartesian
and pre-Rationalist interpretations. Finnis does not, however, break from
the universal "field" but concentrates more on the inter and intra-human
dimensions of the process.
8 [T]he most plausible explanation of the comparative failure of the
ideals of democracy and progress lies in the overestimation their hold-
ers made of the reasonableness, the powers of analytical thought, of
the average man today; that therefore all interested in man's fate
should study with great care the way men actually behave, the relation
between their ideals and their acts, their words and their deeds; finally,
that this relation is not the simple, direct, causal relation most of us
were brought up to believe it is.
C. BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN: THE STORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT 26 (1950) [here-
inafter BRINTON].
9 See, e.g., T. AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Reprinted in G. CHRISTIE,
JURISPRUDENCE 89 (1973), particularly Question 91, "Of The Various Kinds Of
Law" in which Aquinas sets out a hierarchy that includes 1) eternal law, 2) natural
law, 3) human law, and 4) Divine law; concluding in Question 93, Third Article
that ". .. all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from [and
subject to] the eternal law."
10 Finnis, supra note 2, at 1. In writing this article, I received suggestions and
criticisms from various sources. Though they were all useful, one provided a
counterpoint to much of my own work (and premises) and challenged the mean-
ingfulness of Finnis's efforts. Various criticisms from the letter written me by
Earl Finbar Murphy of the Ohio State University College of Law are quoted at
length in these footnotes so that the full flavor of a legitimate alternative view-
point is captured accurately. Murphy states:
Like you, I find Finnis a "software" approach-frankly, too "touchy,
feely" for my preference. My grandmother, a Calvinist, used to say of
my mother's religion, "Well, Wesleyanism is good enough for Carrie,
but you can't call that pap a theology!" Finnis sort of reminds me of
Father Devlin's attempt (American Philosophical Society, c. 1959) to
marry science and natural law or Fred Beutel's Experimental Jur-
isprudence that sought to elevate science to more than lab notes -but
I think those two were better. Still, yours is a valiant effort to make
Finnisian analysis useful. In an age of crypto-natural law (Dworkin)
and the corpses of natural law (despite your brave citation as au-
thorities of Plato, Aristotle, and even Thomas), such an effort is worth
the doing, even if-maybe-it merely shows its futility.
Letter from Earl Finbar Murphy to David Barnhizer, April 17, 1990, p. 1 [here-
inafter Earl Finbar Murphy letter].
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Finnis's altered focus is consistent with what G.S. Brett called "the
original and natural idea of knowledge," identifying the essence of knowl-
edge as "a capacity for overcoming the difficulties of life and achieving
success in this world."" This echoes Aristotle's description of practical
wisdom as a "true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to
the things that are good or bad for man."'12 Finnis thus simultaneously
rejects the dominant focus, or at least reduces greatly the intensity, of
both the theologically centrist and the metaphysically super-rational con-
ceptions of natural law and advances the process of creating a version of
natural law that emerges more from the biological, political, motivational
and rational nature of humans than from more artificial (or ideal) con-
structs. Finnis does not, however, abandon reason and God in hypoth-
esizing how they influence, enrich, and direct the application of natural
law through human thought operating in a practical, political context.
This same kind of humanistic analysis of human capacities and values
is found also in other fields of knowledge that are seeking to overcome
the bondage of scientism and "pure" rationalism.'- Rollo May has, for
example, described our situation as one in which "we are living at a time
when one age is dying and the new age is not yet born.' 14 Central to the
dying tradition is the dichotomy between subject and object; one that has
been called a "cancer" with "most ... modern schools of thought still
[assuming] this split without being aware of it."15
A. The Structure and Focus of This Article
The first part of this article examines some of the main features of
Finnis's theory of natural law. It suggests that Finnis offers a "soft" theory
of natural law anchored in a richer and more realistic conception of human
nature than has generally characterized natural law theory. It brings
forth the role of Aristotelian practicality in Finnis's thinking, explaining
how that assertion distances Finnis from natural law theorists who
11 G.S. BRETT, PSYCHOLOGY ANCIENT AND MODERN 36-37 (1928), quoted in M.
MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 93-94 (New American Library ed. 1969).
12 ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at Bk. VI, ch. 5. But see, Earl Finbar Murphy letter,
To me, though, it's just another variety of result-oriented jurisprud-
ence. Pick the outcome one wants; and then criticize the court's results
if they don't agree with some scheme that purports objectively to reach
one's preferred result. Plato in the Laws was great at that game, as
was Aristotle in his defense of slavery. Finnis, too, certainly runs
along that line, in my view, though arguably more noble.
Earl Finbar Murphy letter, supra note 10, at 1.
13 See e.g., Campbell, Scholarly Disciplines: Breaking Out, N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 1986, at A18, col. 1.
14 R. MAY, THE COURAGE TO CREATE 11 (1975).
15 Id. at 43. "[Llogical positivism asserts that the only valid kind of knowledge
is cumulative knowledge, the kind one finds in natural science." BRINTON, supra
note 8, at 516.
[Vol. 38:15
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grounded their arguments in "pure" reason. Finally, the first part of the
article discusses the roles of what Finnis calls basic human goods, at-
tempting to suggest how the particular basic human goods he advances
intuitively provide an important component of a framework for a more
realistic variety of natural law. These Finnisian basic goods, or reasons
for choice and action, include the valuing of human life, the quest to know
reality, the search for harmony on the interpersonal, communal, and
internal planes, and awareness of a higher level of meaning in the uni-
verse.'
6
The article's second part briefly describes some methodological aspects
of Finnis's theory. The focus explores how Finnis has arguably created a
distinct methodology of natural law that is changed in character from
the more rigid rationalistic varieties that had dominated Western
thought. In doing so, Finnis offers a modern, complex form of natural law
that contains a fuller account of human nature and basic goods as integral
elements of judicial thinking, mission, judgment, and decision making.
The third part seeks to apply Finnis's principles to Justice O'Connor's
opinion in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 17 a decision that makes
it extremely difficult for state and local governments to combat the subtle
devices and consequences of racism except in the most narrow sense.
Croson erects barriers that go beyond a strict scrutiny standard of review
of race-conscious remedial legislation, with additional barriers including:
1) the requirement of significant specificity of findings of discrimination
imposed on state and local governments; 2) the need for local govern-
mental units to find they were either active or passive participants in
the pattern of discrimination they seek to remedy through legislative
action; 3) the overly restrictive method by which the dimensions of the
class of those entitled to remedial relief is computed and thus significantly
limited; 4) the reduced ability of local governments to rely on national
findings about discrimination in a particular field or subsystem of eco-
nomic activity in order to aid in determining the need for and the scope
of remedial action; and, 5) the restriction of state and local governments'
use of statistics about underlying forms of systemic discrimination to
support their analysis of the need for action.1 8
As a result of that "Finnisian" analysis it is concluded that O'Connor's
opinion in Croson reflects the classic tendency to use abstract natural
law principles as ideological assertions to aid an interest group to either
defend against encroachments by others seeking to gain shares of power
or as a justification for seizing power.19 While Finnis's "practical" theory
16NATURAL LAW, supra note 2, at 1-2. See also FINms, supra note 1, at 86-89.
1 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
I Id. See infra text accompanying notes 102-123. During the past year or so,
the Supreme Court has decided a set of affirmative action cases that undermine
the ability of governments, courts, and private litigants to either force or take
remedial steps to redress past discrimination that has continuing structural and
distributive effects which perpetuate the distortions of long-term racism in em-
ployment. See infra notes 22-24. Included among the cases is Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
19 See infra note 57, to the effect that natural law can have a subversive impact
when directed toward entrenched political systems.
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can be abused in this same way, it nonetheless holds substantial promise
as a critical method for analyzing what judges actually do in hard cases.
B. The Idea of Authentic Practical Judgment
Magnificent judicial rhetoric may lack insight, integrity, logic, or mean-
ing in the processes of application and decision. Judicial decisions must
be examined in light of their practical meaning, quality, and authenticity,
not simply in terms of judicial rhetoric or formal logic. Implied within
Finnis's practical theory of natural law is the need for authentic appli-
cation of practical reason in deciding legal controversies. The Aristotelian
concept of practical reasoning is not an abstraction but a principle that
by implication carries within itself the requirement that one who exer-
cises practical reason seek to achieve a heightened level of insight si-
multaneously directed at understanding the conditions of the external
world and the quality and limits of one's own ability. In each dimension
the person is never satisfied with where he or she is, but is continually
seeking to extend, clarify, and enrich the content and quality of individual
awareness.
These considerations suggest that a judge, for example, must: 1) seek
an experientially-based, and accurate, understanding of human systems
and the reality of their operation; 2) be willing to question the quality of
personal knowledge and values; 3) seek to communicate fully, accurately,
and honestly with others; 4) possess the ability to authentically apply
largely abstract principles to the reality of problems with which the ju-
dicial decision maker is confronted; 5) allow a case's internal and external
contextual realities to merge with the principled abstractions and by
doing so define, enrich, and interpret the practical interactions between
fair and just political needs and abstract principles, in essence to under-
stand that principles are energized and given life by the decisional con-
text; and 6) be aware that judicial decisions, and the reasoning processes
on which they are based, are not exercises in either pure or formal logic
but are inevitably a complex set of choices that has been described as not
"a chain of deduction" such as is required by formal logic or mathematics,
but "a succession of cumulative reasons which ... cooperate in favor of
saying what the reasoner desires to urge," and that "the reasons are like
the legs of a chair, not the links of a chain.."20
20 LORD LLOYD, supra note 5, at 1139-40, 1189. Joseph Vining discusses the
idea of authenticity in J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN
(1986).
A statement, document, or text is authentic when it can be taken
seriously. If a statement is to be taken seriously the author of it must
mean what he says.
Id. at 42.
The legal analyst whether lawyer or judge, in erecting the edifice that,
after he is finished, he presents as the law of this or that, or as the
opinion of a court-who is structuring precedents, or sentences, and
deciding which will have more weight than others and which are
[Vol. 38:15
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/5
19901 NATURAL LAW AS PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY 21
Judicial logic is judgmental and practical rather than abstract, and
inevitably demands and reflects a series of both subtle and explicit choices
by judges, not only as to initial or beginning premises, but also as to the
desired outcomes to be served by the decision, and internal preferences
that favor particular values over others. What is therefore being described
is the fairness, quality, accuracy, and authenticity of the subtle hidden,
and often inchoate processes ofjudicial choices that are integral elements
of any judicial decision. In this dimension of qualitative judicial practi-
cality (in the Finnisian and Aristotelian sense), Finnis's theory only be-
gins the process of describing how the internal dynamics of judicial
thought can be examined and how we can evaluate those dynamics as
well as the quality of judges' connecting of their internal world with the
extrinsic conditions being judged.
Given that judicial opinions are woven from choices made by judges
about principles, reality, reasons, language, desired outcome and accept-
able consequences, Finnis's use of the practical dimension as a funda-
mental element of his theory of natural law requires that judicial choices
be understood as practical reason operating in a context of and in ref-
erence to the judge's system of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom can
be defined as the quality of a particular judge's moral, political, exper-
iential, and intellectual understanding.
Understanding the authenticity of a particular judicial application of
practical reason, choice, and judgment forces us to become aware of the
way humans decide complex questions, including the factors that tend to
be generated by what would be accepted as negative elements in the
exercise of human judgment, e.g., ideologic rigidity, blindness to or in-
tolerance of other's legitimate views, closed-mindedness, pursuit of a per-
sonal agenda that is in the interest of a very limited group and/or does
not seek to achieve fundamental fairness or justice, lack of understanding
of factual and experiential realities that are highly relevant to the par-
ticular controversy, and inherent deficiency in judgmental ability. Un-
derstanding whether judges are being authentic in their choices and
decisions is difficult, however, because such analysis requires a subjective
awareness of the judge as a specific human being, in addition to the bare
language used in the decision.
In applying the requirement of judicial authenticity to Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Croson, it is argued that, while she does not fail
at the initial point of her articulation of abstract principles of equality,
personal rights, and the need for a strict standard of review of race-
conscious remedial legislation or affirmative action plans, her practical
reasoning is seriously flawed once she moves away from the initial prem-
ise to the far more challenging processes of authentic application. Lofty
principles are almost inevitably valid as abstractions, as opposed to their
much more complex application to the specific content and context of
particular cases and understanding of their distributive and redistribu-
aberrations and mistakes-will put aside first those texts and expres-
sions in which the speaker was not attempting at all to say what the
law was but was rather saying what he wanted his listeners to think
the law was.
Id. at 43.
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tive implications for society, in other words, their practical levels of mean-
ing. It is at these practical levels of intellectual depth, judgment,
perception of reality, honesty, and fairness that O'Connor fails to au-
thentically analyze the content, context and consequences of the Croson
case.
Justice O'Connor's failure to make authentic connections between ab-
stract premises and their application and consequences is a product of
two factors: 1) the too-rigid structure of her basic core belief systems that
allow her to understand the world she judges only in terms consistent
with the ideological tenets of those beliefs, 21 and 2) a failure of perception
on her part that is exacerbated by the fact that the newly formed majority
of the Supreme Court is engaged in a strategy to undermine civil rights
advances in America.
22
The emergence of the Supreme Court's new political majority has al-
tered not only the controlling ideology of the Court but has transmuted
its decisional dynamics and criteria. The majority's members are largely
freed from the need to compromise and negotiate outside the value pref-
erences of their own group. In affirmative action and civil rights cases,
at least, the new majority is now able to rely on ideological power, rather
than practical wisdom, in choosing cases and designing and expressing
choices.2 3 Members such as O'Connor are less compelled to provide sound
21 Thomas Green describes how humans often organize their core-belief systems
in ways that protect them from evidence that would otherwise require change in
those beliefs, stating:
[Wie tend to order our [core] beliefs in little clusters encrusted about,
as it were, with a protective shield that prevents any cross-fertilization
among them or any confrontation between them.
T. GREEN, THE ACTIVITIES OF TEACHING 47 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GREEN].
22 For a description of Reagan's strategy to create a Supreme Court that would
reflect his views on race, affirmative action and abortion see Press and McDaniel,
Judging the Judges. The Courts are Being Re-created in Reagan's Image, News-
week, Oct. 14, 1985, at 73.
Unable to win Congress over to its views on social issues, the admin-
istration has pinned its hopes on the courts. And it has done so with
no apparent irony, despite the longtime insistence of conservatives
that courts are the wrong place to make policy.
Id. For fundamentalist and conservative opinions on the role of the judiciary and
the proper response. See also, T. LAHAYE, THE BATTLE FOR THE MIND 20 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as LAHAYEI and W. Berns, "Judicial Rhetoric," in RHETORIC
AND AMERICAN STATESMANSHIP 55 (G. Thurow and J. Wallin Ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Berns].
Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the NAACP, recently stated that:
"Four men in judicial robes and one woman in judicial robes [sic] are doing more
to send this nation backward than all the people who wore Ku Klux Klan robes
in the history of this nation .. " Segall, NAACP Chief Blames Court for Rights
Losses, The Plain Dealer, Apr. 6, 1990, at 2-B, col. 3. The Senate Labor and
Human Resources Committee recently approved a bill aimed at reversing what
were perceived as Supreme Court reverses of civil rights advances. Sen. Paul
Simon stated: "The reality is that we have had a retreat on civil rights and we
have to turn it around." Senate Panel OKs Civil Rights Bill: Veto Threatened,
The Plain Dealer, Apr. 5, 1990, at 8-A, col. 1. Contra see, Earl Finbar Murphy
letter, supra note 10, at 2:
[Vol. 38:15
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reasons for their choices, or subject to pressure to comprehend the deeper
meaning of their own choices, than were members of less ideologically
committed or more politically complex majorities of the Supreme Court.24
The final part of this article develops these points in the context of Croson.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FINNIS'S THEORY
A. A "Soft" Theory of Natural Law
The past abuses of natural law should not blind us to its legitimate
uses, ones we have been generally unwilling to explore until quite re-
cently because the theses possessed by Enlightenment and Scientific or-
thodoxies rejected the possibility of metaphysical and religious truth of
which natural law had been seen as an integral part.2 5 It is only recently
that natural law theorists such as Finnis have begun to reweave natural
law into a countervailing thesis to the exhausted languages of discourse
represented in Scientism and Scientific Rationalism.
2 6
I cannot get excited over: (1) these 6 or 7 civil rights cases that have
the legal community (and not just the liberals in that community,
either) in an uproar. They are based on statutory interpretation; Con-
gress can over-rule them legislatively; and, if Bush doesn't veto the
latest Congressional override, Congress has done so. Only if the Court
says Congress cannot do so is there much to be excited about. (2) Nor
am I upset muchly over Republican packing of the federal judiciary.
FDR did it; LBJ did it; Jimmy Carter did it-all for noble motives, of
course. If Tricky Dick did not do it, more fool he. (3) Nor am I bothered
that the neoconservatives would pursue an activist judicial stance, as
Bork would have done and as -maybe -Scalia, Kennedy, et al.-are
doing. Neo is not paleo; and there is no reason to passively accept as
cut in stone what prior liberal activist majorities built from the rubble
of the precedents they found in place and then smashed. As for (4)
O'Connor being "inauthentic" -that sounds more Sartrian to me than
Finnisian; and I do not want to put on paper my view of "Sartre the
great humanist" (Shostakovich, in his diary, covered that subject very
well).
24Press and McDaniel write:
Reagan's approach breaks with past presidencies. By today's stand-
ards, for example, many of Nixon's appointments were moderates;
indeed, many joined in the decisions that the new Reagan judges aim
to reverse. The new strict scrutiny troubles some Republicans. Says
one former senior Reagan official, "The emphasis is almost totally
toward philosophy and disregards almost everything else, including
a willingness to approach issues with an open mind."
Press and McDaniel, supra note 22, at 74.
25 See LORD LLOYD, supra note 5, at 111.
26 The idea of the competing ebb and flow of languages of discourse is described
by C. AXELROD, STUDIES IN INTELLECTUAL BREAKTHROUGH 2-3 (1979).
Ideas do not float freely among people; they become rooted in com-
mitments, ossified and sustained within intellectual communities;
they are cradled among avid sponsors and defenders whose work relies
on their stability. Thus the tension of discourse refers not only to the
presence of one language addressing (and straining) another, but to
the presence of one language addressing the inertia of another.
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
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Those who determine our fundamental premises shape the dialogue
about the proper or true nature of reality. If we agree with the assertions
of thinkers such as Finnis, Rawls, Kant, Aquinas, Pufendorf, Locke or
Hobbes, it is not because they have been proved "right," but because we
want to, or because they seem to "make sense." Their thought can be
useful, conceptually elegant, or simply congruent with our own preferred
values, but a natural law theory will never be proved right, even if ab-
solutely true. This a priori character of natural law is what allowed it to
become a tool of religious, political and philosophical orthodoxies, often
leading to abuses that caused its rejection as anything more than ma-
nipulative metaphysical rubbish or ecclesiastical propaganda.2 7
Natural law of any kind is grounded on faith and assumption concern-
ing the validity and nature of its fundamental tenets. Finnis's theory, as
do all other natural law theories, contains "soft" elements that cannot be
validated through any method considered suitably authoritative, precise,
or scientific. 28 Finnis's theory is even "softer" than most of the grand
natural law schemes that have been advanced, however, because it is
centered much more in humans than in implicit or explicit assumptions
concerning divine existence or the hidden structure of the universe, and
does not pretend to be based on a singular and absolute certainty. Con-
versely, by seeking (or claiming) certainty, the grand natural law systems
inevitably foundered on the fluidly chaotic realities of modern society
while Finnis, by softening and humanizing the focus of natural law, has
created a natural law methodology with far greater potential for useful
application. The fact that Finnis's theory is not yet complete should not
obscure the important and valuable transformation of natural law think-
ing he has wrought by expanding its focus and extending the concepts of
human nature and social purpose.
B. The Functions of Natural Law
Natural law provides a mechanism that compels attention be paid to
what Toynbee called the "questions that modern Science could not an-
swer," those of justice, truth, life, death, purpose.2 9 While natural law
27 See, e.g., BRINTON, supra note 8.
The logical positivist tends to regard all traditional philosophical
thinking, the kind involved in fields like metaphysics, ethics, political
theory, even most epistemology .. as a complete waste of time ....
Id. at 517.
2 Natural law is a noncumulative form of knowledge. Crane Brinton drew the
distinction between what he called cumulative knowledge (science) and noncu-
mulative knowledge (ethics, beauty, literature, justice). See BRINTON, supra note
8, at 13, observing that "our contemporary men of letters are today writing about
the very same things the Greek men of letters wrote about, in much the same
way and with no clear and certain increase in knowledge."2 9 TOYNBEE, supra note 7, at 99-100.
Man's intellectual and technological achievements have been impor-
tant to him, not in themselves, but only in so far as they have forced
him to face, and grapple with, moral issues which otherwise he might
have managed to go on shirking. Modern science has thus raised moral
issues of profound importance, but it has not, and could not have,
made any contribution toward solving them. The most important ques-
tions that men must answer are questions in which science has noth-
ing to say.
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may not produce ultimate answers, it provides a focal point for a set of
fundamental ideals of a kind that complex societies are better off taking
into account in their policy setting and decision making. This equates
with Plato's description of the function of ideals, exemplified by the ideal
of "absolute justice and ... the character of the perfectly just .... .3 Plato
urged that, "[we] were to look at these in order that we might judge of
our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard they ex-
hibited and the degree in which we resembled them, but not with any
showing that they could exist in fact."31
By creating standards of the good and attempting to conform our be-
havior to those standards, we create a mechanism of inquiry that hope-
fully drives us closer to that ideal. As will be discussed shortly, this is a
main element of Finnis's theory. Forgetfulness or denial of the fact that
ideals are aspirational and not true renderings of reality, however, is a
critical flaw and constant danger not only among natural law theorists,
but among judges who continually and unwittingly use natural law
themes in their decisions. In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, Justice Powell warned against relying completely on abstractions
and failing to understand the reality with which the Supreme Court must
deal:
[Cilaims that law must be "colorblind" or that the datum of
race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as
aspirations rather than as a description of reality.
[W]e cannot.., let colorblindness become myopia which masks
the reality that many "created equal" have been treated within
our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow
citizens.3 2
In Croson, for example, Justice O'Connor reifies the ideals of equality
and individual rights to such an extent that she blinds herself to the
reality of the appropriate interplay and balancing that must occur within
practical political systems or, put more cynically, she may understand
the nature of what she is doing and seeks to blind those who read the
opinion.
'0 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 387 (I. Edman ed. 1928)
[hereinafter PLATO].
31 Id. But compare, Earl Finbar Murphy letter, supra note 10, at 2:
"Justice stinks in the nostrils of the common lawyer" has always been
a favorite concept of mine. The common law is a law of process. If due
process is done, then all that a court, or the whole Bar of lawyers, or
the whole panoply of a legal system has done all that can be done.
Otherwise, one calls in the auto-da-fe, or the stormtroopers, or the
other forces that "do the justice thing". Your footnote 79, quoting
Willard Hurst, goes as far in the direction of seeking justice as I can
allow my passion to be carried-although I try not to be a Stefan
George, crying, "When I hear the word culture [in my case, justice],
I reach for my revolver" or like Mayakovsky, declaiming, "Comrade
Politicians [in my case, jurisprudents], give it a rest: Comrade Re-
volver has the floor."
3 2 Regents of The University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (1977).
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In Finnis's system, natural law's function becomes that of guiding and
enriching the development, application, and interpretation of human law
rather than its control. Finnis asserts that "a natural law theory is noth-
ing other than good reasons for choice (and action)," but what are the
implications of this statement? First, it recognizes implicitly that nu-
merous claims have been made about the power of natural law to control
human-made laws. 33 Unlike many of his predecessors, Finnis is hesitant
to claim such ultimate insights. Words like "nothing other" reflect a
calculated effort to avoid claiming too much for his theory of natural law,
recognizing that such a claim would doom his arguments.
Natural law thus assumes two identities. In one guise it is primarily
an internal or personal methodology of life and action rather than an
external or revealed system. In its personal character it provides each of
us with a set of values and reasons through which we can enrich and
clarify our thought processes and choices. In its other use, i.e., an exter-
nalized set of normative premises that arguably ought or do provide a
value matrix and referent for human decision making, natural law offers
a methodology by which the decisions of courts can be evaluated. 34
Finnis's initial premise that natural law is nothing other than a means
of identifying good reasons for our choices distances his theory of natural
law from those belonging either to the religious tradition of natural law
that claimed too much, or highly rationalistic metaphysical sources
grounded in assumptions that the universe was governed by natural laws
emanating from a "natural," essentially Deistic source of pure reason.35
In presenting a "softer" theory, Finnis creates a more humanistic version
of natural law. Finnis does not, however, abandon the existence of a
33 See, e.g., J. LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE (W. von Leyden trans.
1954), particularly Essay VI: "Are Men Bound By The Law of Nature? Yes,"
Reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
In looking at Finnis's theory and thinking about it in terms of a substantive
method, Brinton's language of a healthy form of anti-intellectualism is helpful:[A]nti-inte~lectualism... [is] the attempt to arrive rationally at a just
appreciation of the actual roles of rationality and nonrationality in
human affairs. The term is widely used, however, to describe some-
thing quite different-the praise of nonrationality, the exaltation of
nonrationality as the really desirable human activity, the denigration
of rationality. Such an attitude of dislike for rationality and love for
nonrationality we prefer to call romanticism, the romanticism of
Goethe's "feeling is all."
BRINTON, supra note 8, at 504.
15 Brinton describes the Enlightenment's concept of nature:
Nature was to the Enlightenment wholly a benign concept .... [Tihe
Nature of Newton as filtered down into the educated and half-educated
was the orderly, untroubled, beautifully simple working of the uni-
verse properly understood. Once we understand this nature in human
affairs, all we have to do is regulate our actions accordingly, and there
will be no more unnatural [bad, irrational] behavior.
Id., supra note 8, at 370.
Brinton adds:
"Rationalism as it grew up in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
... is in fact a complete metaphysical system; more than that, it served
for a minority, and continues to serve, as a substitute for religion."
Id., supra note 8, at 336.
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universal structure of values, choosing instead to soften its intensity and
shift its source and content toward the human end of a continuum on
which we still can find God as well as a subtle natural structure to the
universe, at least as far as it relates to humanity.3 6
Finnis's assertion that a natural law theory provides good reasons for
choice and action also implies that humans are capable of comprehending
natural law in some form and, in fact, of creating the specific manifes-
tations of natural law by their choices.37 Finnis theorizes that an iden-
tifiable set of basic human goods provides authoritative, though not sin-
gularly definitive, sources of "natural" values.38 He argues that human
emotion and human reason are practically integrated in such a way that
the basic human goods can be understood and applied in the decision
making process.3 9
Natural law provides a source of authority that is anchored to humans'
deeper beliefs about our own nature, the nature of humanity and of the
universe we inhabit.40 When these beliefs "feel" of sufficient moral or
natural power (and the concept of nature is itself a moral and normative
judgment), the balance can cause humans to suspend their concerns about
36 Finnis includes religion as a basic good. See FINNIS, supra note 1, at 89. For
many the concept of God is inextricably intertwined with the nature of the uni-
verse. Stephen Hawking, one of our leading physicists, writes that the search for
a unified theory of physics will lead to "the ultimate triumph of human reason-
for then we would know the mind of God." S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME:
FROM THE BIG BANG TO THE BLACK HOLE 175 (1988) [hereinafter HAWKING].
1 Natural Law, supra note 2, at 3. The idea of natural law with a variable
content in which the absolute ideal of justice is nonetheless differently applied
depending on the period, culture and needs can be found in J. STONE, HUMAN
LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE, Chap. 6 (1965).
N Natural Law, supra note 2, at 7-8. Finnis argues that there are objectively
good basic human values. Finnis attempts to offer a practical answer to dilemmas
such as Roberto Unger's. In examining the nature of jurisprudential thought,
Unger comments that he soon found himself in a "house of reason ... which...
proved to be a prison-house of paradox whose rooms did not connect and whose
passageways led nowhere." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 3 (1975). Unger
is not rejecting reason as a tool but is questioning the inadequacies of our as-
sumptions. "Reason cannot establish the ends of action, nor does it suffice to
determine the concrete implications of general values on which we may begin to
agree." "Reason," however, is of vital importance, "because it is a machine for
analysis and combination: the capacity to deduce conclusions from premises and
the ability to choose efficient means to accepted ends." Id. at 75.
31 Natural Law, supra note 2, at 1. To Kant, there was only one faculty of
reason but two distinctive applications. "One gives knowledge of things as they
are (or appear); the other gives direction to the changes we introduce into this
natural order by means of voluntary action." L. BECK, A COMMENTARY ON KANrS
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 39 (1960).
40 Boorstin puts our need for a belief in a deeper source of authority than
ourselves as follows:
For us, the idea of a constitution - a fundamental law which in some
strange way is less changeable than the ordinary instruments of leg-
islation - has had a peculiar therapeutic attraction . . . . We retain
an incurable belief that constitutions are born but not made ....
D. BOORSTIN, THE DECLINE OF RADICALISM 88 (1969) [hereinafter BOORSTINI.
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the desirability of the outcome. This suspension helps a society avoid the
resort to actual (rather than latent) force or threat of force to implement
or gain obedience to the particular choice.41
The desire to maintain the stability of our legal system causes Finnis
to argue in favor of obedience to law under nearly all conditions.42
Aristotle also suggested that "the law has no power to command obedience
except that of habit . . ." and that the "citizen will not gain so much by
making the change [in a law] as he will lose, by the habit of disobedi-
ence." 43 Similarly, recognition that the decision was reached through afair and open process of choice to which all are subject, reduces the desire
of those who oppose the decision to resist its implementation at all, or to
resist only by taking action through the system's process, or to at least
refrain from using force.
A critical function of the "field" we call natural law is that it helps
achieve social compromises in situations for which a society otherwise
lacks effective dispute resolution mechanisms.4 The Constitution is, for
example, to a significant degree, a distilled and codified system of naturallaw. It is our primary device for temporarily resolving disputes among
competing interest groups which, without such an authoritative mech-
anism, would be unable to achieve compromise.45 Echoing this theme,
Finnis describes the need for law as follows:
Political authority in all its manifestations, including legal
institutions, is a technique for doing without unanimity that
would almost always be unattainable or temporary - in order
to secure practical unanimity about how to coordinate our ac-
tions with each other, which, given authority, we do simply by
conforming to the patterns authoritatively chosen.46
Finnis's system of natural law offers a kind of "Marquis of Queensbury"
rules. The ultimate intent of such systems is to define the internal and
41 Lawrence Friedman has identified the role of law as a substitute for force,
although the threat of force is always implicit:[I]n complex societies custom is far too flabby to do all the work - to
run the machinery of order. Law carries a powerful stick: the threat
of force. This is the fist inside its velvet glove.L. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW 257 (1984) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN].
42 FINNIS, supra note 1. See also, Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the
Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1985).
13 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Bk. II, ch. 8, reprinted in THE OXFORD TRANSLATION
OF ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross ed.1921) [hereinafter THE POLITICS].
4' Natural Law, supra note 2, at 6.See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes' description of factors that lead to the dissolution
of a commonwealth. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURIS.
PRUDENCE (1973). Friedman describes the situation:[L]aw and ... courts stand at the very core of crucial decisions in theUnited States. These decisions concern policy in many spheres of life,including the major social questions and such sticky issues as ob-
scenity, abortion, sexual deviancy, personal morality....
FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, 275.
' Natural Law, supra note 2, at 6.
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external rules of formalized conflicts and to thereby produce a struggle
that participants and observers will acknowledge to be "fair. '47 The sys-
tem's combination of rules and process operates as a safety valve. If the
terms of dispute resolution are acknowledged as fair by the disputants,
they are more likely to accept the outcome, even when it is unpopular.
Central to such a system is that the particular contest will end with the
specific dispute being resolved according to the terms of the rule system.
The fundamental dispute itself will remain, but its intensity will be di-
minished, at least for a time, by the perceived fairness of the process. An
important feature is that the dissatisfied class of disputants retains the
opportunity to resort to the dispute resolution processes in the future. 4
The "fair fight" resolves the dispute for a period of time and allows the
disputants' anger and energy to be focused, channeled, and dissipated
through formalized conflict rather than through more damaging routes
such as political terrorism or rebellion. Without such a process to manage
and transmute conflict, there would be a buildup of pressure, and ulti-
mately an explosion that could damage the political system itself.
The need for dispute resolution mechanisms always exists, but is in-
tensified in the context of disputes about fundamental values of the kind
that Hobbes argued tended to lead to the "dissolution of a common-
wealth. '49 These are precisely the kinds of disputes that have entered our
legal system in the form of contests over such issues as abortion, the
death penalty, racial discrimination and affirmative action for various
minorities, the relationship between church and state, and limits on the
power of government to regulate and intrude upon individual freedoms.
It is this dispute about fundamental values which is reflected in Croson-
a tension between competing definitions (and applications) of fairness,
47 Aristotle concludes "justice is the bond of men in states, for the administra-
tion of justice, which is the determination of what is just is the principle of order
in political society." THE POLITICS, supra note 43, at Bk. I, ch. 2. John Rawls
continues this theme in describing "justice as fairness." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). The unresolved issue is of course what is fair or just in a specific
context. This is what Croson involves.
418 Once our faith is lost in courts as fair and just mechanisms for resolving
disputes, then the courts' moral command over us diminishes and they become
explicit instrumentalities of power. The conservative and fundamentalist move-
ments have reacted to what they perceived to be morally (and politically) wrong
decisions by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts by generating a move-
ment directed toward seizing control of those courts. This movement has succeeded
substantially in little more than a decade. Walter Berns declaims:
What were we taught by Roe v. Wade? That the constitution is on the
side of the big battalions or, at least, the most strident battalions.
That an up-to-date judiciary is contemptible because it is nothing but
a political body but, unlike a political body ... it pretends not to be.
Berns, supra note 22, at 55.
41 Hobbes identified beliefs that lead to the dissolution of a commonwealth.
1. "That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions."
2. "That whatsoever a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne."
3. "That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and
Reason, but by supernatural Inspiration or Infusion."
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 347 (1973).
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distributive justice, and the limits of political power vis-a-vis the indi-vidual. For both valid and invalid reasons it is a dispute that is impossibleto resolve in any absolute sense but one that must be answered practicallyin the Finnisian meaning of that term.oFinnis's definition of law takes his natural law theory into an opera-tional context while continuing to insist on a vision of an evolving soci-ety. 1 Law and natural law are interacting and overlapping componentsthat are part of an overall system. In Finnis's conception, law is not anunbounded instrument of sovereign will, but is oriented to the furtheringor instantiation of a social and individual vision.52 This we see in Finnis'sdescription of basic human goods, practical reason, and the responsibilityto make decisions that instantiate those basic goods. The fundamentalvision is that of "human flourishing," one essential to our understanding
of Aristotle's practical dimension.5uFinnis argues that the terms of practical systems are created by theact of choosing between "rationally appealing and incompatible alter-natives, such that the choosing itself settles which option is chosen andpursued.."5 4 Even here, however, the nature of the choice evolves withina visionary structure for human societies. The particular system createdby specific choices, and the interaction and competition between bundlesof choices, is not an infinite or random one without limits, direction, andpurpose. As long as the game of choice is played correctly the overallsystem will move in the proper direction, even if there are specific winnersand losers and individual interests will often not be satisfied.
50 A decade ago the Reverend Tim LaHaye outlined a strategy to take over thecourts, including the Supreme Court:[Aimoral humanists have moved in until they control our nation'sdestiny and are seeking to separate her from God. This is particularlytrue of our judges, a high percentage of whom make humanistic de-cisions. Because most judgeships are appointed positions, it will takeseveral years to change that picture. The only way to bring moralityback into our judicial system is to elect strong, pro-moral candidatesto all federal offices particularly in the key position of president.LAHAYE, supra note 22, at 20.51 "The idea of justice is at heart, then the idea of legal criticism." GARLAN,LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE 127, (1941 Rothman Rep. 1981) [hereinafter GAR-LAN].52Natural Law, supra note 2, at 3,6.
- Finnis's theory involves the theme of human flourishing. Finnis argues that"an account of basic reasons for action should not be rationalistic. It should notportray human flourishing in terms only of the exercise of our capacities to reason.We are organic substances, animals, and part of our genuine well-being is ourbodily life, maintained in health, vigour and safety, and transmitted to newhuman beings." Id. at 1. This is a theme found in Aristotle, from whom Finnisderives core elements of his theory. For an excellent discussion see J. M. COOPER,REASON AND HUMAN GOOD iN ARISTOTLE (1975) [hereinafter COOPER, particularlyPart II, "Moral Virtue and Human Flourishing." See also, H. GADAMER, THE IDEAOF THE GOOD IN PLATONIC AND ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHy (1986) (hereinafterGADAMER].
- Natural Law, supra, note 2, at 3.
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C. A Modern, Complex Form of Natural Law
Finnis's softening of the claimed authority and clarity of natural law
was made necessary by the differences between the complexities of the
distribution of power in the pre-Enlightenment phase of natural law, the
political diversity that characterizes many nation-states in the modern
democratic world, and in the altered metaphors science has created in its
description of the fundamental character of universal reality. Finnis's
theory reflects the effects of the more relativistic, Einsteinian worldview
that has partially replaced, at least among intellectuals, the classical
conception of the universe as a perfect and immutable system created by
God and centered on humankind.15 Intellectual transformations such as
have been generated by Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein have
combined to alter our philosophical and scientific worldviews, but have
not destroyed our desire to view the universe and ourselves as created
by God, perfect and unchangeable. The altered worldview has, however,
undermined our ability to hold on to rigid visions demonstrably at odds
with our understanding of physical reality.56 This more fluid worldview
has infiltrated the realms of values, political theory, and natural law by
paradoxically removing our sense of certainty while simultaneously in-
tensifying our desire to hold on to the kind of absoluteness the authori-
tarian and fixed systems afforded.
A similar change in the nature of natural law was dictated by the
altered nature of democratic political orders. In more monolithic social
forms where political and economic power is distributed to only a small
portion of society occupying a very limited set of political institutions,
natural law can and will be directed toward justifying, legitimating, and
sustaining those dominant arrangements. In such a setting natural law
is neither dialectical nor profound. As power, resources, knowledge, and
the instruments of communication become more widely distributed, how-
ever, a change in the "nature" of natural law occurs. Those holding power
still attempt to use the premises of natural law to legitimate and justify
the continuation of their power, but the premises of natural law also
provide theses by which one base of power challenges another, or those
seeking to overthrow or participate in the processes of power attempt to
undermine the claims to legitimacy of those from whom they are at-
tempting to acquire a share.
5 7
15 See, e.g., Hawking's discussion of the effects of our changing conceptions of
the universe in HAWKING, supra note 36, at Chap. 1. See also, Cleveland, The
Creative Combination of Human Limits and Human Opportunities, in STRATEGIES
FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIETIES 76 (D. Barnhizer ed. 1988).
56 Complex democracy diffuses and distributes power more widely. A system
based on communicative media to the extent as represented in the United States
works an even more extensive transfer of interest and opportunity to "know,"
regardless of whether there is a resulting shift in actual power.
51 "By the end of the [eighteenth] century the French Revolution had shown
how what was primarily a conservative doctrine justifying existing law could be
turned into a weapon of subversion .... " LORD LLOYD, supra note 5, at 114.
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As power and knowledge become more widely distributed in complex
societies, the need is heightened for an overarching set of unifying prem-
ises to link the many competing interests. The need for basic unifying
themes in a relativistic, uncertain, and complex system transforms nat-
ural law from a traditionally authoritarian phenomenon into a meth-
odology of roughly textured coherence and balance in the face of extreme
complexity, one that seeks authoritative insights but abandons its au-
thoritarian character.," If this shift did not occur, the strongly authori-
tarian variety of natural law would be relegated to small enclaves of
belief, unable to contribute meaningfully to analysis of basic social prob-
lems. This, of course, is precisely what did happen to the strongly au-
thoritarian forms of natural law. In contributing to the more complex
political mode, however, natural law must function in a weaker sense
because the greater complexity and diversity creates a less powerful
"field" of shared values, the tenuous coherence of which can dissipate
rapidly if too much is demanded.
D. A Finnisian Account of Human Nature:
Valuing Life and Judicial Instantiation of Basic Human Goods
Finnis creates an account of human nature, just as has inevitably been
done by all other natural law theorists, as well as positivist thinkers. 59
While any particular theorist may be unaware of the underlying as-
sumptions, or may instinctively use intermediate masking principles that
obscure the nature of what has been done, no theory, whether of natural
or positivistic law, can be created without making fundamental assump-
tions about human nature and the purposes and ends of political com-
munities. Ernest Becker captured this when he wrote about the
"delicately constituted fiction" of human aspiration:
The world of human aspiration is largely fictitious and if we do
not understand this we understand nothing about man. It is a
largely symbolic creation by an ego-controlled animal that per-
mits action .... Man's freedom is a fabricated freedom, and he
pays the price for it. He must at all times defend the utter fragility
of his delicately constituted fiction, deny its artificiality.6
51 Marc Galanter suggests that the recent "knowledge explosion" in law is
making the law more accessible to many people and causing the law and itsinstitutions to lose their "remote and transcendent character. Its contingency,
discretion, and malleability are visible to a wider audience." Galanter, The Legal
Malaise; Or, Justice Observed, 19 LAW & Soc. REv. 537, 549 (1985).
,9 Finnis accepts the fact that he is presenting a theory of human nature. In
"Natural Law and Legal Reasoning," he states:
To state the basic human goods ... is of course to propose an account
of human nature. ... [A] full account of human nature can only be
given by one who understands the human goods practically, i.e., as
reasons for choice and action, making full sense of feelings, spon-
taneities and behaviour."
Natural Law, supra note 2, at 2.
60 E. BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING 139 (2nd ed. 1971), quoted
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Various principles have been used to mask and defend our fragile fic-
tions.6 1 The most common include those of utility, pleasure/pain as pro-
viding an almost Skinnerian base of human behavior and motivation, the
nature and function of the state, sovereignty, science both as method and
quasi-religion, the existence and quality of God, the nature of private
property, the interpretation of personal existence, and the primacy of
Reason.6 2 Regardless of the auras of precision and power that emanate
from such beliefs, they are nothing more than assumptions about fun-
damental characteristics of reality, not statements reflecting proved, or
even provable, conditions of reality. In spite of, or perhaps due to this
inherent nature, the resulting language is language of power.6 3
The heightened practical orientation used by Finnis reflects the effort
to integrate the multiple human faculties that we have come to refer to
by labels such as reason, judgment, sense, choice and action, all integrally
and intimately tied to humanity functioning in the world.6 4 This practical
in Scimecca, Cultural Hero Systems and Religious Beliefs: the Ideal-Real Social
Science of Ernest Becker, 21 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 62, 63 (Fall, 1979). Aristotle,
for example, based the state in the family, concluding that its function depended
on facilitating the well-being of its citizens. He asserted, "man is more of a political
animal than bees or any other gregarious animals ... " THE POLITICS, supra note
43, at Bk. I, ch. 2, and "that which can[not] foresee by the exercise of mind is by
nature ... a slave;" Id. For Locke, "I assume there will be no one to deny the
existence of God, provided he recognizes either the necessity for some rational
account of our life, or that there is a thing that deserves to be called virtue or
vice." J. LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE, (W. von Leyden trans. 1954)
Essay I. The essay also contains analysis of the different forms of natural law.
Hobbes is known for his depiction of humans as naturally aggressive, savage,
greedy, describing "the condition of man" as "a condition of war of every one
against every one." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUD-
ENCE 306, (1973).
61 See C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932); J. STONE, LEGAL
SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS (1964), particularly ch. 7 "Categories of Il-
lusory Reference in the Growth of the Law." Edward Levi has suggested that
"It]he categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in order to
permit the infusion of new ideas." E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
4 (1949).
62 See generally, J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976), and J.
TAYLOR, THE MASKS OF SOCIETY (1966), particularly ch. 4, "The Masks of Society:
Law."
11 Ruth Anshen concludes: "[Mian is that being on earth who does not have
language. Man is language." R. N. ANSHEN, LANGUAGE: AN ENQUIRY INTO ITS
MEANING AND FUNCTIONS (1983). J. Bronowski, "The Reach of Imagination," in
THE NORTON READER (A. Eastman, ed. 1977) suggests:
The tool that puts the human mind ahead of the animal is imagery.
The symbol is the tool which gives man his power, and it is the same
tool whether the symbols are images or words, mathematical signs or
mesons.
Id. at 170-72.
Overton Taylor captured the essence of the quest in his statement:
The seeker of reasoned, moral wisdom, or knowledge of the principles
which ought to guide us in the conduct of all public affairs, needs the
fullest, universal width or breadth of outlook on the basis, affairs, and
interests not of some but of all human beings and on all departments
of their lives.
0. H. TAYLOR, THE CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, MARXISM, AND THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 94 (1960) [hereinafter TAYLOR].
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construct is of a different character and focus than the speculative, or
purely rational, faculty that is considered to look away from what we
consider the real human toward the illusion of a higher order of existence
that at best tolerates, and often rejects, the true nature of biological
humanity 5
Finnis's concentration on the practical orientation and content of the
rational faculty accepts that humans are biological animals, fully organic
beings, and not independent or other-worldly souls trapped in prisons of
flesh. Practical thought of the kind he calls natural law cannot, therefore,
be restricted only to pure reason, logic or faith, but must seek to integrate
emotional realities and motivations within its sphere of operation. 6 His
concern, however, is not to suggest that humans are possessed by "lower"
bodily and sensory drives, or that they do not possess souls or a profound
spiritual component, but that an enriched faculty of practical reason
properly takes feelings and human emotions into account rather than
simply denying their legitimacy. Finnis is attempting to develop a more
truly human and integrative form of understanding, one beyond the ster-
ile abstractions of pure reason, the excesses of romanticized feeling, and
the rigidity of cold logic. 6 7
Finnis's theory of human nature relies heavily on the primacy of human
life, both in terms of its preservation and qualitative richness.6 He argues
that taking life into account as a central value in decision-making helps
make sense of diverse and complex purposes and goals; in effect, that the
valuing of life as a basic human good creates and sustains a generative,
open-textured decision-making process that enhances the quality of our
society.69
Life and the other basic human goods combine to provide us with good
reasons for choice and action and it is these goods upon which Finnis
grounds his theory. He argues that the "fundamental principle of practical
Finnis reflects much the same idea in his statement that "a full account of
human nature can only be given by one who understands the human goods prac-
tically, i.e., as reasons for choice and action, making full sense of feelings, spon-
taneities and behaviour." Natural Law, supra note 2, at 2.
Rollo May criticizes our extreme dependence on rationalistic processes. R.
MAY, THE COURAGE To CREATE 43 (1965), describes the dichotomy of subject and
object that has long characterized Western thought, as "the cancer of all psy-
chology and psychiatry up to now."
mNatural Law, supra note 2. See, e.g., A. H. MASLOW, THE FARTHER REACHES
OF HUMAN NATURE (1971). Maslow describes the limits on knowledge he perceived
in his own discipline:
In the thirties I became interested in certain psychological problems,
and found they could not be answered or managed well by the classical
scientific structure of the time (the behavioristic, positivistic, "sci-
entific," value-free mechanomorphic psychology). I was raising legit-
imate questions and had to invent another approach to psychological
problems in order to deal with them. This approach slowly became a
general philosophy of psychology, of science in general of religion,
work, management, and now biology. As a matter of fact, it became
a Weltanschauung.
Id. at 3.67 BRINTON, supra note 8.
"Natural Law, supra note 2, at 1.
19 Id. at 2.
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rationality is: Take as a premise at least one of the basic reasons for
action and follow through to the point at which you somehow instantiate
that good in action. . .. ',70 Finnis's activist orientation hauntingly echoes
the prose of John Bunyan in The Pilgrim's Progress as he comments on
the need to not only piously profess good values but to act upon one's
values:
[Alt the day of Doom, men shall be judged according to their
fruits. It will not be said then, Did you Believe? but, were you
Doers, or Talkers only? and accordingly shall they be judged.71
It is not enough, therefore, to simply talk about basic goods. One must
accept the responsibility to engage in authentic application that possesses
the tendency to advance a basic good. This idea is also contained in
Aristotle's description of justice as the highest human virtue because it
was directed toward the welfare of others.
72
Finnis describes the valuing of life as the most basic reason for action,
but also argues for other basic human goods, including:
- knowledge of reality (including aesthetic appreciation of it);
- excellence in work and play whereby one transforms actual realities
to express meanings and serve purposes;
- harmony between and amongst individuals and groups of persons
(peace, neighborliness and, friendship);
- harmony between one's own feelings and one's judgments and
choices (inner peace);
- harmony between one's choices and one's judgments and behavior
(peace of conscience and authenticity in the sense of consistency
between one's self and its expression);
- harmony between oneself and the wider reaches of reality including
the reality that the world has some more-than-human source of
meaning and value.7 3
Finnis urges the necessity of doing nothing without a reason and the
need to seek to apply the chosen good or goods in action, urging us to:
[Alliow nothing but the basic reasons for action to shape your
practical thinking as you find, develop, and use your oppor-
tunities to pursue human flourishing through your chosen
actions .... 14
Phrases such as "undeflected reason," "integral human fulfillment,"
"human flourishing," and the "instantiation of all the basic human goods
in all human persons and communities" also provide insight into key
aspects of Finnis's theory.75 He asserts that, "[u]ndeflected reason will be
70 Id. at 3.
71 J. BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 85 (HARvARD CLASSICS, C. Eliot ed.
1904).
72 Aristotle described justice as the greatest of virtues because it involved the
exercise of virtue between humans, not simply the contemplation of what was
good or virtuous for oneself. THE PoLITIcs, supra note 43, at Bk. VII, ch. 2.
73 Natural Law, supra note 2, at 3.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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guided by the ideal of integral human fulfillment, i.e., by the ideal of the
instantiation of all the basic human goods in all human persons and
communities."
7
.
Such assertions are themselves a substantive construct that reflects
assumptions about the naturalness of human progress, the rightness of
social and individual evolution, the propriety of an expanding pattern of
distributive justice, and the importance of the faculty of reason enriched
by its focus on basic values. In essence, Finnis offers a process which, if
honored in our decision making, could act as a sort of "invisible hand"
helping transcend the complexities and idiosyncrasies of a myriad of
individual decisions and generating a subtly purposive flow toward the
attainment of a more just society. This was Edwin Garlan's point when
he wrote:
Justice states the fundamental method of law-the method of
purposeful activity that is, action directed toward ends. Law
is teleological, and justice in its broadest terms is the statement
of that fact and is in a sense the instrument which keeps law
teleological in its method. Justice expresses and celebrates this
purposeful orientation of law; it is formative because its use
keeps men sensitive to their responsibility and willing to fight
for concrete achievements. It thus is the expression for the
motive power of law . . .77
III. SOME METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
FINNIS'S THEORY
A. A Methodology of Substantive Categories of Thought
Finnis's methodology centers on individually rational choices by hu-
mans, including judges, oriented to the attainment of basic human goods,
much in the same way that Adam Smith's invisible hand depended on
the operation of individually rational choices concerning economic op-
portunities .7 Finnis creates a form of natural law whereby the substance
is brought into being and energized by the medium and focus of the
inquiry, combined with a vision of the desired outcome, rather than by
a specific, predictable, substantive principle.7 9
76 Id.
77 GARLAN, supra note 51, at 125.
71 Finnis remarks: "[IUt is the diversity of rationally appealing human goods
which makes free choice both possible. .. ." Natural Law, supra note 2, at 3.
19 This idea is captured by Marshall McLuhan's famous observation that the
medium is the message, and by Charles Silberman's suggestion that:
The essence of the law ... is the emphasis it places on what Willard
Hurst calls the "substantive importance of procedure"-on the rec-
ognition that means shape and even determine ends - that the way
men do things may be more important than what they do. The way
men do things determines what kinds of men they are and what kind
of society they have, as much as the other way around.
Silberman, Educational Trends and the Law, CLEPR NEWSLETTER (August 1971).
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Finnis's theory is also a subtle mechanism for conditioning us against
using our political institutions for false ends. It is much like Hannah
Arendt asked in The Life of the Mind, "[c]ould the activity of thinking
as such ... be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-
doing or even actually 'condition' them against it?"' 0 By creating a goal-
oriented but open-textured decisional mechanism in which judges are
required to consider basic human goods and to use a particular sort of
value-laden language, Finnis's natural law medium could generate iden-
tifiable classes of increasingly more probable substantive outcomes, even
if specific outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty. His natural law
theory is sufficiently open-textured that it would rarely dictate a partic-
ular answer in hard cases involving the clash of competing conceptions
of the good, but it would produce a principled answer that could in an
important sense be thought of as right. In fact, the right outcome is
produced by choosing among good alternatives with the act of choice itself
the means of transforming options that only possess the "potentiality of
rightness" into the right answer 1
Finnis's theory is not dependent on judges being able to find a single
right answer, or there even being a single "natural" right answer that
preexists the act of judicial choice.8 2 Of course, Finnis's identification of
basic human goods will exclude many options from the bundle of poten-
tially right answers because they do not reflect a basic good or are in
conflict with, and presumably "trumped" by, the meta-goods of life and
human flourishing. Finnis's theory allows for and anticipates that dif-
ferent choices can properly be made among a group of potentially "right"
answers among which judges may choose, with a requirement that they
articulate sound reasons for their choices. While his principles do not
dictate a specific answer for the judge, they define the underlying values
and goals for the choices that must be made and impose an obligation on
judges to attempt to extend the values reflected in basic goods more deeply
into our social fabric.
B0 H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND: VOL. ONE/THINKING, 5 (M. McCarthy ed.
1978).11 Natural Law, supra note 2, at 9, argues that while there is not a "uniquely
correct" answer to hard cases, there is a "right" answer, defining it in terms that
state: "the choice [between rationally appealing options] established the "right"
answer-i.e. established it in, and by reference ultimately to, the dispositions and
sentiments of the chooser." Id. at 9.
8 2 For the idea that there is a single right answer even to "hard" judicial
questions see, R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), [hereinafter cited
as DWORKIN] particularly chapter 4, Hard Cases. Such a view reflects a pre-
Einsteinian conception of the fixed nature of reality, one that seeks certainty,
shies away from ambiguity and relativity, and chases the illusion of a fixed
universal truth. Relativity, random motion, and uncertainty as reflected in mod-
ern physics have become powerful metaphors that have created pressures on fixed
systems that the adherents of those systems are still seeking to ignore. Finnis
disagrees with Dworkin, arguing that, "we approach cases which have not been
simply settled by prior choice or an applicable rule-hard cases-with a view to
finding good answers, and rejecting bad ones, but we should not dream of finding
a best answer." Id. at 13.
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The most difficult question, however, is how are competing sets of al-
ternative and incommensurate goods to be given weight and priority. It
is not enough to say that the debate ends at the point of good faith judicial
choice between competing goods and that the resulting algorithm or sub-
algorithmic permutation is therefore "right." We need more than a so-
phisticated restatement of categories of inquiry, to which judges refer
when selecting a particularly exotic judicial repast. Certainly, there is
validity and utility in establishing a formula to assist decision making.
But the question is whether any good faith decision that chooses a basic
good is sufficient to meet Finnis's standard or if there is some specific
way in which his theory helps decide between difficult alternatives as
well as identifying wrongly motivated choices masquerading as reason-
able alternatives?
B. Judicial Conservatism and Finnis's Theme of Harmony
Harmony is a dominant theme in Finnis's system of basic human goods,
appearing in at least four of his primary categories. Finnis's choice of
language is troubling in part because it is so appealing. Finnis's lan-
guage-"life and human flourishing," "knowledge," "reality," "aesthetic
appreciation," "excellence," and four categories of basic human goods in
which harmony is a fundamental element, evoke, within me at least, such
feelings as peace, grace, and goodness. It describes what we ought to be
or think we ought to be in a sort of fully-realized, harmoniously blissful
state of existence much like we assume characterized Eden before the
fall from grace. This is not a basis of criticism from a personal or individual
perspective. From a systemically practical viewpoint, however, such pro-
found, almost spiritual values may well end up as tools of legitimation
and preservation of dominant interests, just as has traditionally been so
with natural law concepts.
A significant danger is that, politically, the aura from the value of
harmony tends to produce an unconscious preference for structures that
appear harmonious primarily due to their scale and inclusiveness. To
illustrate, an irony of Croson is that American conservatives have long
chastised liberals for their preoccupation with "big-government" and
large-scale approaches to problem solving, but the consequences of Croson
will centralize more power in the federal government while denying to
state and local governments the opportunity to take innovative, focused
action. Croson helps us understand that sacred political themes can often
serve as strategies to gain power or defend one's position. Even if believed
by their advocates, such arguments will frequently be little more than
propagandistic tools for justifying claims to power and legitimacy1 3 The
Slogans and propaganda have been substituted for intelligent exchanges of
positions, data, and values. Virtually everyone sees those who disagree with them
as an enemy rather than the source of alternative concepting and viewpoints.
Slogans are "rallying symbols" that "in no sense describe what actually exists,
yet they are taken-wishfully or desperately-to be generalizations or statements
of fact." M. GREENE, TEACHER AS STRANGER 70 (1983).
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reason that conservatives such as O'Connor and Rehnquist seek principles
to justify the shifting of power from local political institutions, on its face,
an honored tenet of conservatives, to the national level, may be because
the new phenomenon of urban political institutions in which blacks par-
ticipate meaningfully for the first time in creating distributional rules
may intuitively offend their instinctive preferences. Because whites are
no longer in control of the urban political process and do not sufficiently
trust the motives of the urban legislative bodies, i.e., substantially black,
the rules of the game concerning what types of decisions allowed are
changed in cases such as Croson.
It may be that some conservative thinkers such as Justices O'Connor
and Rehnquist are comfortable with the free-form structures implied by
the laissez faire thesis only when their political interest group determines
the rules. If this is so, the structure they implicitly prefer without un-
derstanding its discriminatory nature is not free and open-textured for
all. The principles they assert are devices which preserve and enhance
the interests of those already possessing substantial power because they
can use their power "freely" to gain more power and prevent access by
other groups. The arguments in favor of laissez faire approaches, "trickle
down" economics, and Social Darwinism, for example, help resist demands
on the power and resources of political conservatives and provide argu-
ments against the legitimacy of large-scale welfare states that would tend
to interfere with the existing allocation of power and resources, even
demanding some reallocation. Such principles may, properly understood,
and responsibly articulated, provide important antitheses to the seem-
ingly inevitable tendency of political systems to progressively absorb and
interfere with the interests of the individual. They do not, however, pro-
vide an adequate or complete foundation for a workable system of dem-
ocratic government.
Even if not politically conservative, judges are judgmentally conserv-
ative, and judicial algorithms grounded in values such as harmony and
aesthetics will tend to reflect the political and social beliefs and prefer-
ences of the judges.- Smaller scale strategies such as are reflected by the
action of the Richmond City Council in Croson will tend to subtly offend
the justices' sense of harmony and aesthetics even if they are not con-
sciously aware of their response. To members of a Supreme Court uncon-
sciously committed to maintaining utopian themes that imply large scale
order, individuality and creativity, including small-scale responses by
localized elements of the political system, will automatically take on a
more threatening, random, and chaotic appearance.
84For the idea that judges are responsible for reformulating "ultimate truths"
in language appropriate to the culture within which they are deciding cases, see
Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of
Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 PIrrrs. L. REV. 127 (1988).
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C. The Limits of Judicial Choice
Francis Bacon recognized a practical limit on the form and content of
judicial thought, concluding that judicial opinions ought not go wherever
the logic of law and justice leads, but should be confined to consideration
of the "immediate cause" before the court. Bacon explained: "[ilt were
infinite of the law to judge the causes of causes, and their impulsions one
of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause andjudgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree."85 In other
words, it is practically important to draw lines that constrain the scope
of judicial thought.
Such observations by themselves do not answer the questions of
whether judges either can or should rely on explicit natural law models
in reaching decisions. Given the nature of the judicial task and role, the
judge's focus on solving finite disputes, the significant degree of discretion
already exercised by judges, and the danger of legitimating direct en-
gagement ofjudges' core belief systems, while Finnis offers a method that
has great promise for scholars seeking to analyze what judges do, it may
be too amorphous a tool in the hands of judges, who, as Bacon suggests,
ought be restricted as much as possible to finite realms and specific au-
thority rather than embarking on even more discretionary and personal
voyages than at present. This does not, however, deny the validity of
Finnis's method, suggest that judges ought not understand its implica-
tions, or imply that individual judges should not strive to comprehend
the quality of their thought in reference to the Finnisian criteria. It does,
however, assert that Finnis's criteria are not self-sufficient sources of
authority in the absence of other standards.
Judicial choices are a form of action, of doing, and the judge's respon-
sibility is not fulfilled by professing the importance of particular values
while crafting decisions that fail in fact to advance those values.8 6 Judges
create, apply, and act through words of power. Their interpretations of
the characteristics of disputes are not ephemeral musings but specific
actions that generate strong consequences both directly on participants
and through their effects on the "field" or "web" of forceful principles
reflected in the law.8 7
Judges must, therefore, be able to distinguish goods from bads, unmask
false goods, understand the contextual reality of the case and its social
85 F. BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE MAXIMES
OF THE LAW REGULA 1 (1630).
I have always liked the judicial attitude of Skelly Wright as described by
Arthur S. Miller. See A. MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL
ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT (1984). At a minimum the judicial responsibility
is governed by the nature of the judicial task, defined long ago by Aristotle: "iT]he
nature of the judge is to be a sort of animate justice .... The just, then, is an
intermediate, since the judge is so ... [tlhe judge restores equality." ARISTOTLE,
supra note 2, at Book V, ch. 4(B).
17 The idea of the "field" is a powerful metaphor for both science and philosophy.
See the discussions in HAWKING, supra note 36.
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and political implications, and avoid the tendency toward self-deception. 8
Judges must seek to understand the nature and quality of their own core-
belief systems, work to improve those systems, and attempt to transcend
the distortions of reality generated by individual systems of belief of which
we are often unaware.8 9 A major premise of this article is that in Croson,
Justice O'Connor failed in these processes of practical intellectual anal-
ysis and judgment.
We are easily seduced by the tension between what we would like to
be and what we are. Similarly, given the inherent conservatism of the
judiciary, values that rely heavily on themes such as harmony and aes-
thetics contain an internal quality that will cause judges to be even more
conservative than at present. Most of Finnis's basic goods, therefore, while
appealing as a utopian vision, will produce consequences that are often
at odds with the vision. I make this point even while feeling pulled toward
accepting Finnis's system, because it "feels" right.
D. Hard Choices and Incommensurable Goods
Finnis is concerned not only with the fact of basic goods and their
recognition and interpretation through practical reason, but also with
the need to make choices consistent with those goods. This is both a
strength and weakness of his theory. The effort to extend natural law
analysis to the actual processes of decision making reflects significant
intellectual courage. Finnis recognizes that a legal controversy involves
critical choices between alternative, often incommensurable, conceptions
of basic goods or, perhaps more important, between competing processes
or means for instantiating a basic good through the act of judicial choice.
This dilemma of choice is continually faced by judges in "hard" cases,
ones for which there is no sufficient source of clearly dispositive authority
and in which the choices made by judges create operative principles of
law (or legal algorithms) that allocate significant bundles of rights and
responsibilities."
8 Arthur Brown has suggested that our institutional systems often make us
"stupid," while Donna Kerr concludes they lead us to deceive ourselves. Brown
states:
Institutions are social systems that shape not only our actions but
our values and dispositions .... [T]o the extent that institutions shape
our values and dispositions they can make us stupid.., and stupidity
deprives us of our humanity.
Brown, Foreword to D. KERR, BARIERS TO INTEGRITY: MODERN MODES OF KNOWL-
EDGE UTILIZATION IX (1984); Kerr describes the effects of such systems as leading
to lies and self-deception. Id. at 29.
Thomas Green offers a penetrating analysis of core belief systems, including
how we are able to hold internally inconsistent beliefs that allow evidence to
penetrate only to particular systems. The danger is that our core beliefs resist
inconsistent data without us being aware that we are doing this. A judge such
as O'Connor can therefore feel she is absolutely correct in her perception of reality
and in her principles, and thus be able to feel that she is operating in principled
good faith. GREEN, supra note 21, at 43.
90 See e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 82.
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It is particularly important that judges be able to penetrate the veils
of false goods argued for by advocates or hidden deep within the judges'
own belief systems. This is extremely vital in the context of what we are
calling hard cases because those cases are ones that result in substantial
distributions and redistributions of power and social goods and are the
controversies that shape public awareness of law and justice,'
Each phase of this choice process represents a distinctive and increas-
ingly difficult task for judges.9 2 The choice process includes: 1) the iden-
tification and analysis of the presence of basic human goods in a
controversy; 2) the interactions between competing conceptions of the
good; 3) the understanding of the nature and limits of one's personal
beliefs; 4) the penetration behind masks of rhetorical arguments; 5) the
choice of action to instantiate basic goods; 6) the ranking or prioritizing
of basic goods; and 7) understanding the consequences of one's choices.
There is also a critical, practical difference between someone acting as
a self-interested individual and seeking to make proper choices concern-
ing basic goods, and a judge who must persuade others as to the author-
itativeness and rightness of the choice and whose exercise of practical
wisdom is not primarily self-directed but system directed. A main dis-
tinction between the personal and the judicial orientations is that the
judge's decision must be framed within a system of values that are ac-
ceptable to many others of diverse beliefs.9 3 There is thus a rhetorical
and symbolic aspect to judicial opinions that makes them very different
from individual decisions concerning what is good for oneself. The indi-
vidual's decision can be much more "pure" or even more selfish than the
judicial or, stated differently, the nature of what is correct within the
judicial system must take into account the practical nature and needs of
that system, including the system's readiness to accept particular con-
cepts of justice, distribution, and obligation. This idea is demonstrated
clearly in Furman v. Georgia as the members of the Court struggled with
the issue of "evolving standards of decency" as applied to whether a
political community ought put one of its members to death.9 4
91 A case like Croson is arguably a "zero-sum game" in which gains by one
group require losses by another.
91 It is difficult because there often is no right answer or at least no answer
that is capable of achieving a societal conscious. If this is not enough the belief
systems of the judges and the particular cultural segment from which judges
emerge, as well as the quality and extent of the judge's experience in life gained
prior to appointment combine to obscure the reasons and answers even from thejudges themselves. See, GREEN, supra note 21.
"3 Judicial decisions need to be framed within an acceptable set of positive
social values held by the society within which the decision is to operate. This is
not always possible but Justice Blackmun recognized the need in Roe v. Wade as
he reiterated Holmes understanding that "[The Constitution] is made for people
of fundamentally differing views .... " Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973);(quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
", Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972), (Douglas, J., concurring)("evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"
quoting from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958))
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E. Finnisian Algorithms and Judicial Choice
To Finnis, "the law" is a "cultural object, constructed or posited by
creative human decision,... an instrument which we adopt because we
have no other way of agreeing amongst ourselves over significant spans
of time about precisely how to pursue our moral project well."95 According
to Finnis, a function of law is to provide "algorithm[s] for deciding as
many questions as possible .... As far as it can, the law seeks to provide
sources of reasoning - statutes and statute-based rules, common law
rules, and customs - capable of ranking (commensurating) alternative
dispute resolutions as right or wrong, and thus better or worse." In
Finnis's view, judges transmute competing sets of incommensurable but
good reasons from states of potentiality to ones of "rightness" through
their acts of choice and their justification of those choices. Those judicial
choices shape, alter and create many of the conditions of legal and political
reality. If law involves the choice of algorithmic designs to clarify and
simplify social choices, natural law helps fill in the foundations for the
algorithm by providing good reasons for rules, interpretations, and claims
to authority and legitimacy.
Algorithms of law are formulae to which we automatically turn when
confronted by both simple and difficult questions. Most algorithms are
simple formulae which rapidly and efficiently resolve large numbers of
disputes for which any of a number of rules would have been sufficient.
Algorithms such as consideration, reliance, and reasonableness are ex-
amples of formulae which structure and help to resolve most conflicts
over relevant legal questions.
As we move away from simple algorithms dependent on a generally
shared set of values, to areas where conflict exists concerning the validity
and desirability of the underlying values themselves, increasingly more
complex, controversial and tenuous algorithms are needed to resolve dis-
putes. At simpler levels, or ones on which the underlying values sup-
porting the algorithm are shared generally, an algorithm is effective in
large part because it is accepted as being validly created, i.e., the choice
was made properly according to the rules. As the social stakes get higher,
however, there is a need to have stronger reasons for choice or, alterna-
tively, a need to make the choice between incommensurable goods fit or
at least seem to fit into strong basic reasons of a kind held by many in
a society.97
95 Natural Law, supra note 2, at 6.
9 Id.
Oddly enough, I find myself agreeing with both Machiavelli and George
Gilder at least to the extent that they recognize that political leadership and
effective action is not dependent primarily on what might be called "fully en-
lightened reason" and idealism, but that key political decisions must depend upon
appealing to the accepted beliefs of those being led, to some degree. Gilder puts
the point as follows:
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The idea of algorithms describes an important element of the law, but
it does not answer the need to have something on which to ground the
choice of an algorithm. Although the fundamental values from which the
legal algorithms emerge are limited in number, they generate an inev-
itable inner tension because they represent competing and overlapping
subsystems, fundamental values, and preferences rather than a single,
integrated, and complete system.9 8 Beneath, surrounding, and permeat-
ing the specific algorithms of law are the formulae, benchmarks, deep
principles, "grundnorms," or similar foundational beliefs that taken to-
gether comprise our attempts to express something intelligible about the
ultimate character of the values that underlie our decisions.9 9 This sphere
of deep values, however, is not a smoothly consistent "seamless web," but
a collection of webs, many of which contain significant tears and gaps. It
contains multiple subsystems of competing and inconsistent values as
well as idiosyncratic and unsystematic beliefs.
The more powerful algorithms of law emerge from the increasingly
general and deeper thematic forces of natural law, which themselves
derive from even deeper assumptions and beliefs. 100 The social and polit-
ical outcomes produced by particular choices of legal algorithms will differ
depending on which set of deeper principles provides the grounding values
for the formula chosen. Finnis's theory consequently does not resolve
disputes as much as it sets terms of controversy and establishes conditions
of legitimacy.
Inevitably failing to fulfill the impossible dream of a society without
conflict or hierarchy, the supposed idealists [here read Liberals] often
lash out at the very attitudes and institutions-social pressures and
legal processes-that are indispensable to all social improvement in
a democracy. Idealists, for example, always much abominate what
they call hypocrisy. But hypocrisy-the insincere profession of unful-
filled ideals-is the means by which the influence of ideals is extended
beyond the small circles of true believers.
G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 107 (Bantam ed. 1982).
11 Dworkin argues that the "law may not be a seamless web, but the plaintiff
is entitled to ask Hercules [Dworkin's super-judge] to treat it as if it were."
DWORKIN, supra note 82, at 116. See generally, N.K. HAYLES, THE COSMIC WEB:
SCIENTIFIC FIELD MODELS AND LITERARY STRATEGIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1984).
9 Pareto argued that "residues" provided the force that binds human societies:[Wihat does move men in society, and keeps them together in society,
says Pareto, is the residues. These have extraordinarily little intel-
lectual in them, though they are usually put in logical form. They are
expressions of relatively permanent, abiding sentiments in men,
expressions that usually have to be separated from the part that is
actually a derivation, which may change greatly and even quickly.
BRINTON, supra note 8, at 521.
100 There are two distinct kinds of residues that fall into:
1) persistent aggregates (regularity, discipline, and tradition and
habit), and
2) instinct for combinations (novelty and innovation, hating disci-
pline, etc.). Pareto claimed that all men were mixtures of these
residues, mixtures that were logically inconsistent.
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IV. AN APPLICATION OF FINNIS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW
A. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. is an attempt to deal with the
distributive consequences produced by long-term, pervasive public and
private racism in the United States, and the political tensions resulting
from remedial efforts aimed at redressing the effects of those past injus-
tices. Croson is an ideal case for determining whether Finnis offers a
useful analytical approach for identifying and evaluating: 1) whether
judges intuitively use the framework of values he describes, 2) the quality
of that use, and 3) if Finnis's theory helps to better understand what has
been done. What follows is at best a rough and preliminary attempt to
apply aspects of Finnis's system to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson.
Even that preliminary effort, however, suggests that ideas such as the
valuing of life and human flourishing, the need to choose among com-
peting goods, the importance of fundamental algorithms of law, and the
responsibility to accurately perceive the reality of the conditions involved
in a case such as Croson and to make authentic connections between
statements of principle, reality, and consequence are extremely useful
tools.
B. American Apartheid
One may describe a great deal of past and present political behavior
by whites toward black Americans as American apartheid, just as much
as that which we frequently profess to deplore in South Africa. A main
distinction between the two situations, however, often seems to be that
the diametrically different proportions of racial mix in America and South
Africa allowed and required different strategies of control. South African
apartheid was forced to use more heavy-handed, visible, and explicit
measures to achieve its purposes because whites could not rely on a
pretense of democracy, given the much larger numbers of black South
Africans. The white majority in the United States has, however, been
able to dominate the political, legal, and economic processes to such a
degree that the law and other potent mechanisms of power could be used
as more subtle, rather than brute, instruments of discrimination and
control. Until the late 1960s, for example, in locations where blacks out-
numbered white voters, measures such as poll-taxes, literacy tests, and
even physical intimidation of black voters operated as extremely effective
mechanisms of repression.
Claims such as were made by Justice O'Connor in Croson to the effect
that there is no basis for remedial action for blacks because there is no
logical way to differentiate them from any other kind of minority are
nonsensical if the practical reality of being black in America is under-
stood. American apartheid, though less explicit and formalized, was for
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black Americans as profoundly oppressive as its South African counter-
part. This suggests that O'Connor's use of distorted interpretations of
Constitutional language and social reality in an effort to undermine the
civil rights process in America is an attempt to allow the continuation
and expansion of the subtle and pervasive forms of racial discrimination
that have increasingly become the primary devices for perpetuating racial
discrimination in America. 0 1
My initial premises concerning the reality of racial discrimination in
America are contained in the following assertions: 1) American racism
is deeply rooted and profoundly intertwined throughout all our economic,
political, and social institutions. 2) The effects of racism are continuing
and discrimination on the basis of being "black" offends any fair concept
of fundamental justice. 3) Deeply embedded racial prejudice among many
white Americans is manifested in subtle discriminatory judgments in the
discretionary sphere of decision making. 4) Economic structures exclude
most black Americans from participating in our society in a meaningful
as opposed to menial manner (including gaining employment in the
skilled crafts and construction industry). 5) Housing and residential pat-
terns confine a significant proportion of blacks to "urban reservations."
6) Our welfare system breeds dependency for the inhabitants of those
urban reservations. 7) Educational systems in our major cities often have
45-50% dropout rates among predominantly black students, and provide
a poor quality of education for most of the students who do remain. 8)
There is a stigma based on simply being black that is far more powerful
and morally repugnant than any lower-level stigma that individuals such
as Justice O'Connor are increasingly arguing is created by preferential
remedial plans. 9) Many blacks face the denial of the opportunity for even
a basic quality of life and have never been allowed to reach the level at
which discussion of "human flourishing" becomes meaningful. 10) Com-
pared to white Americans, blacks have shorter life spans, higher infant
mortality rates, and much higher chronic unemployment rates. 11)
Whites generally accept a separate urban culture with higher crime rates,
drug dependency, and violence that is allowed as long as it is committed
by blacks against other blacks and restricted to the black community.
12) An inevitable inferiority complex exists among many blacks that has
been generated as a byproduct of racial discrimination, a "self-fulfilling
prophecy" that makes it even more difficult to counter the effects of racism.
10, Justice Marshall recognized in Croson the way that racism adapts itself and
its strategies to the dictates of law in observing the ingenious forms it takes.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 745 (1989). Justice Burger
understood this in his opinion in Fullilove citing an important governmental
report on the failures of non-remedial strategies to alter the patterns of racist
choices in the economic sphere and in the subtle barriers that existing economic
subsystems erect to prevent access by black Americans. Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1979).
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C. Background Information on Croson
In Croson, the city of Richmond, Virginia had adopted a Minority Busi-
ness Utilization Plan (Plan) requiring prime contractors awarded city
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount
of each contract to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises" (MBEs),
which the Plan defined to include a business from anywhere in the country
at least 51% of which is owned and controlled by black, Spanish-speaking,
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens.102
The Richmond City Council adopted the Plan following a public hear-
ing. The Plan required prime contractors awarded Richmond city con-
struction contracts to "subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of
the contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs).0'3
The requirement did not apply to contracts awarded to minority owned
prime contractors. 0 4 The Plan declared its purpose to be remedial, there
were no geographic limits on the area from which an MBE could be hired,
and it provided for full or partial waiver of the set-aside requirement
when a prime contractor demonstrates that every possible attempt has
been made to locate and involve MBEs. An MBE was defined as "[a]
business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled
... by minority group members." The stated purpose of the Plan was to
promote "wider participation by minority business enterprises in the con-
struction of public projects." By its terms the Plan expired on June 30,
1988, months prior to argument in the Supreme Court.
At the public hearing, presentations involved testimony by seven in-
dividuals. Five of the individual presentations opposed the Plan, while
two were in support. The City Council also relied on a study indicating
that:
102 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 712-13. See, however,
Earl Finbar Murphy letter, supra note 10, at 2-3:
But I may be wrong on all the above. Maybe I should be excited by
these issues. Still, I am not. What does excite me, however, is the
potential for dishonesty within such legislation as that passed by the
Richmond council. These schemes are the sort of contrivance Boss
Tweed would have found ready-made for his purposes and Boss Plun-
kett would have called "honest graft." Assume everything you say
about racism is true, how is an innocent black youth shot by a police
officer, who racistly assumes all black youths to be criminals, bene-
fitted by giving money to white capitalists investing in "black" firms?
I don't see it-and the fact that black has quotation marks around it,
as one adjective and not as another, is evidence why. Yes, such ordi-
nances may strengthen capitalism; do strengthen local political/busi-
ness ties; and may spread the taxpayers' money around the trough a
little more evenly-maybe. (Again that ever-present, for me,
"maybe"!) But, at best, only a marginal good results, purchased with
(at least) the risk of a considerable bad.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 713.
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[Wihile the general population of Richmond was 50% black,
only .67% of the city's prime construction contracts had been
awarded to minority businesses in the 5-year period from 1978
to 1983. It was also established that a variety of contractor's
associations, whose representatives appeared in opposition to
the ordinance, had virtually no minority businesses within
their membership . . . . The city's legal counsel indicated ...
that the ordinance was constitutional under this Court's de-
cision in Fullilove v. Klutznick .... 105
One councilperson stated that in his years of experience as a lawyer and
through his familiarity with the local, state and national construction
industry he had come to understand that "race discrimination and ex-
clusion on the basis of race is widespread" on all three of those levels.10 6
Opponents of the Plan argued that: 1) the statistical disparity between
Richmond's black population (50%) and the number of prime contracts
awarded to MBEs (0.67%) did not establish discrimination in the con-
struction industry; 2) there may not be enough MBEs in the Richmond
area to meet the 30% set-aside goal; 3) non-Richmond MBEs might come
in and take jobs away from area workers, and 4) nonminority contractors
in the Richmond area did not discriminate. The Plan passed 6-2, with
one abstention. 10 7
The J. A. Croson Company challenged the Plan, claiming that it vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The District
Court upheld the Plan, relying on a finding of five predicate facts that
were considered to be a reasonable basis for the legislation. 10 8 The Court
of Appeals (Croson I) found that national findings of discrimination in
the construction industry, in conjunction with the statistical study of
grants of prime contracts for the years 1978-1983, rendered reasonable
the City Council's conclusion that "low minority participation in the city
contracts was due to past discrimination."'0 9 The Supreme Court re-
manded for reconsideration in light of its intervening decision in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education"0 and on remand, a divided Court of Ap-
05o Id. at 714. Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1979).
o"Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.
107 Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 714.
1o8 Id. See also, Earl Finbar Murphy letter, supra note 10, at 3:
Croson might have done far better to have played the local game. But,
then, the very "flexibility" in the Richmond ordinance, which seems
just, may have made that impossible. Croson had chosen its partner;
but the whole matter was withdrawn for new bidding and the dance
could not go on between Richmond, Croson, and Croson's minority
supplier. Again, not a relevant datum. But why did Richmond throw
all the rules up in the air when Croson came in (late, to be sure) with
the minority contractor it all along had been seeking (of which the
city seemingly had been kept informed). Wouldn't the ordinance had
to have been predicated, anyway, on higher bids from minority con-
tractors, if the council truly meant to make the ordinance produce a
statistically meaningful result? Just this sort of reference (at your pp.
45-46) is the one that tends to excite me.
109 Id.
10 Id. at 716. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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peals (Croson II) struck down the set-aside plan as violating both prongs
of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the standard that had arguably been applied in Wygant.11'
The Supreme Court affirmed the second decision of the Court of Appeals
striking down the Plan. Applying a strict scrutiny test to its review of
the Richmond Plan, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's
holding that:
(1) the Plan was not justified by a compelling governmental
interest, since the record revealed no prior discrimination by
the city itself in awarding contracts, and (2) the 30% set-aside
was not narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose.'1 2
In doing so, the Court attempted to distinguish Croson from Fullilove,
relying primarily on a reinterpretation of the scope of Congressional civil
rights power under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
contrasted with what, after Croson, appears to be significantly diminished
remedial powers available to state and local governments seeking to
redress the distortions caused by long-term racial discrimination in their
geographic areas.
This judicial formula obviously contains several critical elements that
state and local legislative units must now take into account in attempting
to craft race-conscious remedial measures. First is the shift to a strict
scrutiny standard of review from the intermediate standard utilized by
the Supreme Court in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke and Fullilove in
which race-conscious remedial actions were examined in light of a strong
standard of review but were not treated in the same way as were racially
discriminatory statutes of the traditional "white v. black" kind clearly
aimed at disadvantaging identifiable and largely powerless minority
groups.113 Justice Marshall indicates in his dissent that the newly formed
majority of the Court is now equating true remedial measures with stat-
utes attempting to preserve racial discrimination, tarring each with the
same brush.11 4
The ability to identify a compelling state (or local) interest was made
dependent upon, or is defined by, the city having itself actively or pas-
"' City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (Croson 1).
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 882 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987) (Croson H1).
112 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 717.
113 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Fullilove v.
Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Justice Marshall comments that:
My view has long been that race conscious classifications designed to
further remedial goals "must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives"
in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 743.
114 "For concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different standard
of review than the most brute and repugnant forms of ... state-sponsored racism
.... " Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 752.
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sively discriminated in some way against minorities, with specific and
substantial findings required as a predicate to the enactment of a remedial
plan. After Croson, even when active or passive discrimination has been
documented and a compelling interest arguably identified, local govern-
ments can apparently only create remedial plans that respond directly
and narrowly to that specific type of discrimination. A local government
can arguably take essentially the same kind of action as if it were a losing
defendant in a suit for racial discrimination and subject to a specific court
order pursuant to a finding of guilt. Given the traditional opposition
voiced by conservative judges toward federal interference with state and
local government, it is ironic that the decision in Croson hamstrings local
governments and intrudes the Supreme Court's judgment far into the
integrity of those governmental processes.1t 5
For the city project involved in Croson, the Croson Company received
the bid forms on September 30, 1983, and testified in the District Court
that, on that same day, 5 or 6 MBEs were contacted with none expressing
interest in the project or offering a quote. Subsequently, on the day the
bids were due, representatives of the Croson Company again telephoned
a group of MBEs. One MBE (Continental) expressed interest and sought
price quotes from several supply companies. One supply company refused
to supply Continental with a quote, while the other company indicated
a lack of familiarity with Continental and stated that before supplying
a bid estimate it would be necessary to do a credit check that would
require at least thirty days.11 6
Given that the Croson Company was the only bidder on the prime city
contract, it was awarded the bid on October 13, 1983. On October 19,
1983, Continental (the MBE) was still unable to supply the bid figures
for fixtures needed by Croson, and on that date Croson asked for a waiver
of the 30% set aside requirement on the grounds that Continental was
"unqualified."'1 7 After Croson's waiver request, Continental contacted an-
other supplier and subsequently gave Croson a figure that was $6,183.29
higher than that included in Croson's bid. Croson then asked the City to
allow a price increase to cover the higher cost of the fixtures. The City
instead decided to rebid the project and awarded the prime contract to a
different company." 8
115 Justice Marshall critizing the Croson majority's disbelief of the finding of
the Richmond City Council, concluding:
Disbelief is particularly inappropriate here in light of the fact that
appellee Croson, which had the burden of providing unconstitution-
ality at trial ... [citing Wygant] has at no point come forward with
any direct evidence that the City Council's motives were anything
other than sincere.
Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 749.
116 Id. at 715. Marshall discusses at length the record relied on in Fullilove
and the studies suggesting other methods than race-conscious remedial legislation
had been tried both nationally and in Richmond but had failed. Central to the
analysis was the existence of entry barriers that prevented minorities from par-
ticipating meaningfully. Id. at 740-43.
117Id. at 715.
118 Id.
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D. The Incommensurable Values of Croson
Finnis's theory involves the need to make choices between incommen-
surable, but good, alternatives. At the abstract, rather than practical
level, Justice O'Connor's opinion and Justice Marshall's dissent each offer
"rationally appealing and incompatible alternatives." At the practical
level, however, O'Connor's opinion does not reflect the exercise of practical
wisdom in the Finnisian sense, lacking an accurate perception of racial
reality, consequences, and the complex intellectual judgments involved
in applying fundamental premises to difficult issues.
O'Connor, for example, relies on a basic belief in individualism, iron-
ically masked by heavy reliance on language of liberal equality often
considered incompatible with individualism."19 This tension between the
ideals of individualism and liberal equality is revealed in her statements
that:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'20 [Individu-
alism]
The "rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual.
The rights established are personal rights.' 2 [Individualism]
[O]ur interpretation ... stems from our agreement with the
view expressed by Justice Powell in Bakke, that "[t]he guar-
antee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else when applied to a person
of another color."'122 [Liberal Equality]
The dissent's watered-down version of equal protection review
effectively assures that race will always be relevant in Amer-
ican life .... 123 [Liberal Equality]
See, e.g., J. GARDNER, EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT Too?
(1961). Taylor states an important change in political attitudes of liberalism and
individuality:
[I]n spite of the fact that the views and attitudes of our remaining
devotees of that older tradition are now generally described-correctly
enough in one sense-as conservative or even reactionary, the old
liberal ideal was a society of largely free or ungoverned or only self-
governed, independent individuals, living together under and jointly
supporting a small, simple, inexpensive government having only a
quite limited sphere of authority or a few quite limited powers and
functions.
TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 7.
120 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 720-21.
12 Id. at 721.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 722.
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Justice Marshall, on the other hand, raises arguments that emerge
from beliefs profoundly opposed to Justice O'Connor's, at least at the level
of the practical consequences of the Court's decision. The tenor of the two
decisions reflects the real distinction between a too-rigid ideologic form
of judicial analysis that avoids the richness of issues and judgment and
a form of judicial thought that attempts to understand the true nature,
meaning, and consequences of the decision being made.124 This does not
mean that Marshall is himself free of distorting personal biases or that
he performs his task perfectly, but unlike O'Connor, one has a feeling in
reading his dissenting opinion that Marshall is attempting to resolve
Croson in a just and practically wise manner.
Marshall, for example, demonstrates a considerably keener under-
standing of the consequences of the Court's decision in such statements
as: "[T]oday's decision marks a deliberate and giant step backward in
this Court's affirmative action jurisprudence,"' 25 and, "[t]he more gov-
ernment bestows its rewards on those persons or businesses that were
positioned to thrive during a period of private racial discrimination, the
tighter the dead-hand grip of prior discrimination becomes on the present
and future. 126
Marshall also sees the complex contrast of doctrines of equal protection,
affirmative action, and continuing discriminatory behavior. His com-
ments can be understood as saying that prior versions of the Supreme
Court understood better the wisdom and effectiveness of intermediate
and substantial standards of review for remedial legislation, recognizing
that racial discrimination is like a mutagenic virus, taking a myriad of
"ingenious and pervasive forms.'1 27 This awareness comprehends that, a
"profound difference separates governmental actions that seek to remedy
the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral governmental activity
from perpetuating the effects of such racism, '12 and government action
that directly or indirectly discriminates against minorities on the basis
of race.
E. Justice O'Connor's Analysis
The authenticity of any judicial decision involves: 1) the language cho-
sen by the judge to clothe the concepts; 2) the choice of language to attack
opposing premises; 3) the judge's deeply buried system of values and core
124 O'Connor's language seems both overly aggressive and brittle, perhaps re-
flecting the fact that:
[M]any people . .. find it almost impossible to realize that Socrates,
in his precept "know thyself' was urging upon the individual the most
difficult challenge of all. And they likewise find it almost impossible
to understand what Kierkegaard meant when he proclaimed, "to ven-
ture in the highest sense is precisely to become conscious of one's self."
R. MAY, MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF 55-56 (1953).
125 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. at 745.
126 Id.
127 Id. at at 717.
128 Id. at 752.
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beliefs that are often unexamined clusters of symbols determining the
judge's conceptual structure and defining how the judge is able to see the
world; 4) the implicit aims of the judicial decision maker, including il-
legitimate as well as legitimate goals; 5) explicitly presented judicial
goals, both in terms of the specific case and the larger systemic conse-
quences of a particular choice of judicial algorithm; and 6) the judge's
ability to perceive and interpret reality at all levels including the factual,
legal, interpretive, predictive, and consequential.
Justice O'Connor begins her opinion in Croson with the assertion that
the Court again confronts "the tension between the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of equal treatment to all citizens, and the use of race-
based measures to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination on the
opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our society.' 129
O'Connor makes several assertions of note, including:
1) The purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool;1 30
2) Unless they [classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may . . . promote notions of racial inferi-
ority and lead to a "politics of racial hostility";'3'
3) Affirmative action typically involves the decision by a politically
dominant group to disadvantage themselves; 13 2
4) A generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in
an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
determine the precise scope of the inquiry it seeks to remedy. It
"has no logical stopping point";l33
5) An amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in a
particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial
quota;13 4
6) It is sheer speculation how many minority firms would be in Rich-
mond absent past societal discrimination; 135
7) The factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled
to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the ju-
diciary .... But when a legislative body chooses to employ a suspect
classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to the
classification's relevance to its goals; 36
8) In rejecting the District Court's findings of five predicate facts in
support of the Plan Justice O'Connor claimed that, "standing alone
this evidence is not probative of any discrimination in the local
construction industry;' 1 37
"2 Id. at 712.
"' Id. at 721.
"'Id.
Id. at 722.
"'Id. at 723.
Id. at 724.
135 Id.
"'Id. at 724-25.
117 Id. at 726.
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9) To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open
the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every dis-
advantaged group; 138
10) The dream of a nation of equal citizens in a society where race is
irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost
in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasur-
able claims of past wrongs; 1 9
11) The 30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal,
except perhaps outright racial balancing. It rests upon the "com-
pletely unrealistic assumption that minorities will choose a partic-
ular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local
population" (citing her own opinion in Local 28, Sheet Metal Work-
ers v. EEOC regarding the fact that minorities will not "gravitate
with mathematical exactitude" to particular areas of employment
in numbers that reflect their makeup in the population); 140
12) The history of school desegregation in Richmond and numerous
congressional reports, does little to define the scope of any injury
to minority contractors in Richmond or the necessary remedy.14 '
The highlighted language suggests that Justice O'Connor is attempting
to persuade and justify much more than engaging in a practically wise
effort to understand and explain either the reality of racial discrimination
or the continuing need for legitimate remedial action. 42 Like any rhe-
torician, O'Connor selects language of'justification and legitimation when
supporting her position, and language of delegitimation when employed
against others' arguments. 143 Consider, for example, some of O'Connor's
most basic terms contained within the passages quoted above. Her lan-
guage includes "generalized assertion," "no logical stopping point," "amor-
phous claim," "unyielding racial quota," "sheer speculation," "standing
alone this evidence is not probative," "rigid racial preferences," "open the
door to competing claims ... for every disadvantaged group," "Richmond's
claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis," "the
dream of a nation of equal citizens ... would be lost in a mosaic of shifting
preferences," "completely unrealistic assumption ... lockstep proportion,"
"mathematical exactitude," and "little to define the scope of injury."
Such language is of the character employed by rhetoricians attempting
to persuade, not by someone concerned with doing justice in a complex
"I Id. at 727.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 724-28.
141 Id. at 727.
14, ARISTOTLE, The Epilogue, reprinted in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE (L.
Cooper ed. & trans. 1932); PLATO, supra note 30, at 292, 306.
143 Aristotle captured the essence of rhetoric:
[Y]ou must render the audience well-disposed to yourself, and ill-disposed to
your opponent; (2) you must magnify and depreciate [make whatever forms your
case seem more important and whatever forms his case seem less]." ARISTOTLE,
The Epilogue, reprinted in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 3.19 (L. Cooper ed. &
trans. 1932).
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and morally troubling area where incommensurable values of both good
and bad kinds are in conflict and a principled exercise of practical wisdom
is demanded. The fact that O'Connor is seeking to persuade and justify
by magnifying the arguments that support her position and depreciating
her competitors' analysis does not in itself condemn her opinion. It is
inevitable that O'Connor desires that her opinion be taken as credible
and legitimate and that opposing arguments be shown to be inappro-
priate. When one's use of rhetoric becomes extreme, however, and where
the author of such language demonstrates a rigidity and brittleness of
thought, as well as a failure to understand the conditions of reality within
which a particular case is embedded, legitimate rhetoric becomes ille-
gitimate propaganda. 4 4
O'Connor's interpretive language has little to do with either the reality
of Croson or the current conditions of racial discrimination in America.
There was, for example, no "unyielding racial quota" in Croson. While
roughly similar to the statutory plan in Fullilove, the Richmond Plan
provided for a waiver of all or part of the set aside requirement in ap-
propriate situations. The fact that the language of the Fullilove waiver
provision was slightly softer than in Croson is primarily due to the intent
of Congress to allow for exemptions in regions of the United States where
virtually no minorities resided.
A repeated thread in O'Connor's analysis is the disaggregation of the
factual predicates on which the Richmond City Council relied in enacting
the Plan. O'Connor is not in fact applying a strict scrutiny standard to
Richmond's action. She is reciting platitudes of strict scrutiny while cre-
ating a unique Constitutional standard for review of legislative action,
one that is troublingly similar to that applied in criminal litigation, i.e.,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard entirely inappropriate outside
the sphere of specific criminal litigation. O'Connor is acting much like a
trial or appellate judge reviewing a challenge to a prosecutor's presen-
tation on the basis of whether "each and every element has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than seeking to weigh the totality of
the evidence. This mindset, intended or not, goes far in explaining why
O'Connor disaggregates Richmond's legislative evidence and insists on a
specific evaluation of each component.
O'Connor questions single elements as if each must in itself be a suf-
ficient reason for creating the Plan. This is obviously what was feared
by Justice Brennan in Bakke who warned about the standard as being
"strict in theory, fatal in fact."' 14 The hollowness of O'Connor's analysis
can be found in the fact that Richmond never attempted to rely on a single
14In propaganda it is important to distinguish between being accurate fac-
tually and how the progandist lies or distorts in the phase of interpretation and
intention. Jacques Ellul describes the need for factual accuracy and the great
difficulty involved in identifying falsified interpretations and professions of intent:
"[N]o proof can be furnished where motivations or intentions are concerned or
interpretation of a fact is involved." J. ELLUL, PROPAGANDA 57 (1965).1Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978).
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category of evidence, "standing alone," but, as indicated clearly by the
District Court, and as analyzed by Marshall, depended on an interwoven
set of findings. Viewed interactively and cumulatively, i.e., the way in
which evidence is evaluated in any situation other than the reasonable
doubt defense of a criminal case, the legislative evidence strongly supports
the conclusion that racial discrimination existed in Richmond's construc-
tion industry when the Plan was created.
There was also no claim by Richmond that "past societal discrimination
alone" would be a sufficient basis for the specific action it took. 146
O'Connor's continual repetition of this theme ignores the valid distinction
between generalized assertions of undifferentiated racism, regardless of
their truth, and proof of systemic discrimination against blacks (or other
minorities) in identifiable units of economic, educational, or political ac-
tivity.' 47 O'Connor's concern about the implications and consequences of
accepting the thesis of general societal discrimination as a standard for
legitimating either court decisions or legislative strategies is valid. Stand-
ing alone, such a "standard" would in fact provide no standard, but an
emotionally charged political fulcrum that would intensify racial hostility
and resentment rather than ameliorate it.
The difficulty, however, is that O'Connor's "general societal discrimi-
nation" is primarily a rhetorical device having little or nothing to do with
the pervasive systemic and subsystemic discrimination that was the focus
of the Richmond Plan. In that more focused "systemic," rather than "so-
cietal" context, there is Court precedent that takes into account the reality
of racial discrimination and the burdens of proof and persuasion appro-
priate to those systemic contexts.
Similarly, the fact that indicators of general societal discrimination do
not and ought not provide a sufficient basis for justifying or focusing
remedial activity by state and local governments has no logical relevance
to the important questions of: 1) whether knowledge of the consequences
of particular forms of discrimination can legitimately aid our understand-
ing of the sources, extent, severity, intractability and scale of the systemic
discrimination; 2) how we should design the remedial mechanisms; and
3) how long the remedial efforts should last. It seems obvious, for example,
that the more sweeping, intense, and pervasive the contextual pattern of
general discrimination in an area such as Richmond, the more justified
it will be for the City Council to take remedial action of a strong character,
the more compelling the state interest, and the burden of providing spe-
cific proof as to the existence of racial discrimination in systems and
subsystems ought to be lowered rather than raised.
Finally, no one, other than O'Connor, made the assertion that minor-
ities would move in "lockstep proportion" or with "mathematical exact-
itude" to particular industries or areas of economic activity. In fact,
O'Connor's footnoted reference to such an assumption was oddly enough
146 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 728 (1989).
147 Id. at 727.
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a reference to a point she herself had made in a prior case, an exercise
in judicial "bootstrapping."
F. Equality, Human Flourishing, and Distributive Justice
Merit, fairness, equality, and distributive justice have been basic
themes since Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics. By now these
themes are so deeply embedded in our belief structures that they are
elements of our basic patterns of thought. Either because Aristotle was
right, or because his concepts dominated our educational and intellectual
systems for centuries, his themes resonate within us at deep levels of
thought and feeling. 148 Aristotle argued that distribution of a community's
resources depended on individual merit, linking merit to distributive
justice, fair treatment, and proportional equality as necessary conditions
of a just state. 149 When the state violates or allows violations of these
basic tenets it sows the seeds of its own corruption, transforming itself
from what Aristotle described as a true form of society to a more corrupt
version. 150
If a political community blocks or denies basic opportunities for its
citizens, or favors one group or individual over another on criteria other
than that of merit, the community has violated its "natural" charter.15 1
This Aristotelian ideal is embodied in the constitutional principles of
equal treatment relied upon by Justice O'Connor in Croson as she argues,
for example, that:
The Richmond Plan denies certain citizens the opportunity to
compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely
upon their race. To whatever racial group these citizens belong,
their "personal rights" to be treated with equal dignity and
respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole
criterion in an aspect of public decision-making.1 5 2
148 TOYNBEE, supra note 7, at 86. Toynbee describes: "In Western Christendom
this Hellenic intellectual alloy became overwhelmingly dominant after it had
been reinforced in the twelfth century by the 'reception' of Aristotle." Id.
149 The universal and chief cause of... revolutionary feeling [is] ... the
desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who
have more than themselves or, again the desire of inequality and
superiority, when conceiving themselves to the superior they think
that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors.
THE POLITICS, supra note 43, at Bk. V, ch. 2.
110 Aristotle described three true forms of government (kingly rule, aristocracy,
and constitutional government) and three perversions (tyranny, oligarchy and
democracy). THE POLITICS, supra note 43, at Bk. III, ch. 7. He concluded that the
distinguishing factor was that the true forms sought to serve the common good
of all citizens while the perversions had the benefit of specific classes as the
purpose. In the real world, democracy was considered the most fair because it
more closely approximated a true form of government, and its abuses would be
less centralized.
"I1 "[T]he state or political community ... aims at good in a greater degree
than any other, and at the highest good." THE POLITICS, supra note 43, at Bk. I,
ch. 1.
1. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 719 (1989).
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This passage reflects deeper values of fairness, equality, equal treat-
ment, innate human dignity, individuality, and merit. It also contains an
implicit conception of the nature of human society. The real question,
however, is not sufficiently captured by such recitations but must be
understood in its practical sense. This is where O'Connor's reasoning
weakens and she makes insupportable leaps from abstractions to flawed
interpretations of Croson's reality. O'Connor either fails to recognize the
differing textures of a political and economic majority's rights to maintain
their opportunities or to expand them, and the need to create basic life
opportunities for racial minorities who have been deliberately prevented
from participating in the economic and political system, i.e., denied the
basic opportunity to even embark on the path of Finnis's (and Aristotle's)
human flourishing.153
While equality and equal treatment are fundamental principles both
in terms of political theory and our Constitution, at stake in Croson is
not equality of treatment at all, but the earlier question of the nature,
extent, and direction of the responsibility of a political community that
deliberately and grossly mistreated a specific class of its members. This
is not simply an argument that blacks are entitled to some sort of "war
reparations." It is a recognition that our political community is in fact a
community and that it owes the obligation of doing justice to its members.
American society has the responsibility to facilitate the ability of
blacks, as a particularly abused class of citizens, to arrive at a point of
rough equality of opportunity before O'Connor's analysis of equal treat-
ment and distributive fairness is triggered. A practical concept of justice
must recognize historical realities and behaviors, it must take prior in-
justices into account, it must understand the legitimacy of balance, com-
promise, and trade-offs and, above all, will not claim to have a single or
absolute meaning. This is the key difference between judicial analysis
that is practical but principled in the Finnisian sense, and analysis such
as is relied on by O'Connor that seeks to assign fixed and frozen meanings
to deeply complex terms such as equality, fairness, equal treatment and
the like.
If there had not been a totally pervasive pattern of private and public
discrimination against blacks in America, then much of O'Connor's anal-
ysis might be correct both practically and abstractly. In that nonexistent
America, apparently perceived as current reality by O'Connor, a different
kind of substantive practicality would apply. If the extent of American
discrimination had only been relatively mild rather than total or had
truly ended several generations ago, O'Connor's concern about insisting
on more precise and limited vehicles of remedial action and the need for
a very strict standard of review would be appropriate. But American
history is one of nearly complete discrimination against black Americans,
not one of moderate discrimination, or even limited pockets of intense
discrimination. O'Connor, and the others who joined her in Croson, either
153 See COOPER supra note 53 and GADAMER, supra note 53, concerning the
social ideal of human flourishing.
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refuse to recognize, or their core beliefs block their ability to recognize
that the systemic discrimination against blacks is of a different character
and texture than what they describe or have experienced.
15 4
The issue in Croson is therefore not one of equal treatment but of equal
access to opportunities that, only when roughly achieved, make O'Con-
nor's abstract concerns about equal treatment and preservation of the
"dream of equality" valid. At that point the disposition of race-conscious
remedial legislation is obvious, and O'Connor's two-dimensional analysis
would apply. We are not even close to that level of racial justice, however,
and Croson consequently generates a "chilling effect" on local govern-
ments' attempts to create innovative solutions to attempt to mitigate the
effects of racial discrimination. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of
assessing the moral legitimacy of the Supreme Court's new majority, it
must be concluded that the result was intended, or most charitably, that
they simply do not understand that the reality of the world they are
judging bears scant resemblance to their fairy tale perception of America's
racial behaviors.
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Utility of Finnis's Theory
The utility of Finnis's theory of natural law lies not in its ultimate
explanatory power as an accurate depiction of universal reality, but in
the fact that humans have the power and the ability to choose the terms
of society that they consider most appropriate and just, and to decide that
they desire to act in ways that increase the likelihood of realizing that
vision of society.
Whatever the peculiar nature of their intellectual prison, humans pos-
sess the power to define its internal rules of operation. It is irrelevant
that this power may not be cosmically ultimate. Belief in an order of
reality beyond humans acts as a critical force for natural law, regardless
of the actual existence of that order of reality, and whether or not it is
labeled as God. 5  In other words, if God did not exist, we would need to
invent some equivalent source of deep authority that functioned as a sort
of "surrogate-God."'156 This is in fact what Finnis is doing in his description
14 There is a distinction between use of principles in good faith in an effort to
describe reality and pursue ideals, and the use of arguments relying on principled
themes as part of a conscious political strategy. The comment has been made that
"[t]he tradition of American moral and political thinking is not, anti-intellectual.
The practice of a good deal of American politics, and of much of American life
... is anti-intellectual." BRINTON, supra note 8, at 513.
55 "Positivism... tends to banish God and the supernatural from the universe."
BRINTON, supra note 8, at 335. FINNIS, supra note 1, at 89, states the religious
idea has meaning for a society whether or not true.
116 There are two false routes by which the human mind seeks to fulfill
the need for a deeper grasp on being. One is the way of scientism,
which refuses to recognize the essential boundaries of scientific
thought. The other is an undisciplined appeal to sheer feeling and
purported irrational sources of insight.
J. COLLINS, CROSSROADS IN PHILOSOPHY: EXISTENTIALISM, NATURALISM, THEISTIC
REALISM 33 (1962).
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of factors such as basic human goods, the valuing of human life, and the
nature of practical thought. He is creating a natural law for a post-
Enlightenment society that has been struggling with the dilemma of
seeming to be alone in a universe without a directly engaged or commonly
accepted Supreme Being, and that has come to know that science is an
inadequate and incomplete substitute.157 Daniel Boorstin captured the
essence of our dilemma in The Decline of Radicalism:
The discovery, or even the belief that man could make his own
laws, was burdensome .... [N]early every man knew in his
own heart the vagueness of his own knowledge and the uncer-
tainty of his own wisdom about his society. Scrupulous men
were troubled to think that their society was governed by a
wisdom no greater than their own. 158
Given our dilemma of self-doubt and the need to be able to accept the
validity of others' choices, natural law keeps open the question of a deeper
and wiser (because it is not simply human and we know we are not
sufficiently wise) "nonhuman" source of authority upon which we can
ground our choices. 59 Natural law is a paradoxical attempt to construct
a theory of wisdom while being tacitly aware that a degree of manipu-
lation of public awareness is essential to a society's ability to function.
Finnis, like all other natural law theorists, is a political architect whose
theory is an hypothesis about the necessary characteristics of a society
that desires to be free, harmonious, just and equitable, and to facilitate
the development or flourishing of each member. Finnis's theory attempts
to fill the gap between the Existentialist thesis of aloneness, moral rel-
ativity, and personal responsibility, and a loss of faith in the ability ofhumans to identify "true" choices about basic goods. Finnis offers a theory
of what humans should value if our societies are to be more likely to
possess the desired characteristics.160 The real question is not whether
Finnis describes some sort of absolute truth, but is he practically correct?
Does Finnis's theory provide a workable hypothesis about a practical
decisional methodology that will enable us to move toward the chosen
conditions of a "good" society?
At a minimum, if we have decided that a political community of the
kind Finnis describes is, (a) the most natural and proper, and/or (b) the
form of society we have chosen to create and facilitate, then Finnis's
157 Id.
18 BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 74.
159 [T]he mystery - of law in modern society ... [is] How retain any
belief in the immanence of law, in its superiority to our individual,
temporary needs, after we have adopted a whole-hearted modern beliefin its instrumentality? How continue to believe that something about
our law is changeless after we have discovered that it may be infinitelyplastic? How believe that in some sense the basic laws of society aregiven us by God, after we have become convinced that we have given
them to ourselves.
BOORSTIN, supra note 40, at 76.
160 Natural Law, supra note 2.
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theory is about what processes and values are most likely to have the
greatest tendency to sustain and enhance our ability to achieve those
goals. If these two judgments about ends and means are made, regarding
the desirability of achieving a specific kind of political community and
the processes most effective in achieving that community - then Finnis's
theory becomes one of "effect and cause." To "effect" (create, bring about)
a specific set of social conditions, attention must be given to an identifiable
set of central, core, or basic values that, when instantiated in the behav-
iors of a society, will "cause" that society to more closely resemble the
desired vision.
Much work must be done by legal scholars in order to explore the limits
and techniques of Finnis's theory as represented in the context of judicial
decisions. Finnis's hypotheses must be seen in the light of their ten-
uousness. Finnis offers a more human-centered theory of natural law
than past natural law theorists, but the question remains concerning
whether his collection of human goods will help clarify decision-making
or instead produce an even more complex series of inevitably conflicting
and incommensurate human goods that generate apparently principled
reasons for almost anything the decision maker prefers. Here I find myself
in agreement with Justice Rehnquist's concern about the importance of
judicial restraint, one he voiced in Furman v. Georgia:
Rigorous attention to the limits of this Court's authority is
likewise enjoined because of the natural desire that beguiles
judges along with other human beings into imposing their own
views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others. Judges differ
only in that they have the power, if not the authority, to enforce
their desires.1
6
1
Rehnquist's advice about the inevitable tendency of judges to abuse
their power and to impose their personal views on others would be lan-
guage well-heeded by both himself and O'Connor now that they comprise
part of a majority on the Court that will resolve questions about funda-
mental issues of "goodness, truth, and justice." Croson represents a sig-
nificant exercise ofjudicial power that appears to violate Rehnquist's own
warnings about the potential for beguiled abuse of judicial power. Of
course, in Furman, Rehnquist was speaking from the posture of dissent,
which seems to have much to do with the nature of arguments about the
appropriate limits on the exercise of judicial power.
B. A Critique of Justice O'Connor's Opinion
The inauthenticity of Justice O'Connor's opinion lies in her application
and interpretation of the initially principled language upon which she
attempts to ground her analysis; her refusal to understand the reality of
racial discrimination in America; her disaggregation and deemphasis of
161 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the factual and legal predicates relied on by Richmond's City Council in
enacting the Plan; her failure to pursue other legitimate ways in which
Croson could have been decided; her failure to draw reasonable distinc-
tions between Wygant and Croson, and her generally simplistic distin-
guishing of Croson and Fullilove.162 A single flaw in one of these
dimensions could be accepted as a simple lapse in judgment. The series
of distortions in which O'Connor engages leads, however, to the conclusion
that, 1) it is an intentional choice on her part and/or, 2) her belief system
is sufficiently rigid that she is incapable of either fairly analyzing or
comprehending the true nature of the issues involved in Croson and in
the area of affirmative action generally.
In Croson, O'Connor fails to make an authentic connection between
her profession of basic goods, the case's reality, and her choice of means.
O'Connor, for example, ignores the century during which the language
of equal protection and personal rights upon which she relies as being
close to an absolute standard was dishonored by the decisions of the
Supreme Court, and at virtually all levels of government throughout the
United States. 163 Her recitation of the American "dream of equality" ig-
nores a condition that for blacks has been, and remains, more a "night-
mare of inequality" than a "dream of equality." Until very recently, the
rights of generations of black citizens were violated in every dimension
of their existence. Some progress has been made, but American racism
remains extraordinarily pervasive. Given the explicit prohibitions
against racist behavior contained in civil rights laws, we seem to have
shifted from overt racism to a multitude of implicit approaches that, as
Justice Marshall indicates in Croson, increasingly take "ingenious and
pervasive forms."'1r O'Connor's opinion reduces our ability to counteract
these subtle, but very real, mechanisms that perpetuate ongoing racism.
162 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) also involved an affirmative
action set-aside statute granting preferences to minorities. The Congressionally
created provision was essentially identical to the one passed by the City Councilin Croson, with main differences being that the federal statute established apreference for minority contractors in the Public Works and Employment Act of
1977 that set-aside 10% of relevant federal contracts for the same categories of
minorities covered by the Richmond Plan. Justice Burger wrote the main opinionin Fullilove upholding the 10% MBE, with Justice Blackmun concurring in thejudgment and reiterating the test he and three others supported in Bakke. JusticesStewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented. There Burger reviewed the data relied
upon by Congress in considering the need for the set-aside provision including
reports on the U.S. construction industry that expressed disappointment with
attempts to devise effective solutions using tools that were not race-specific and
that a shift had occurred away from overt discrimination to a "business system
which is racially neutral on its face but because of past overt social and economicdiscrimination is presently operating, in effect, to perpetuate those past inequi-
ties." Id. at 466.
16 Justice Marshall, in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
examined how the Supreme Court participated in subverting the purpose of theEqual Protection Clause as a judicial reaction to efforts to grant black citizens
equal rights.
1'6 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 745 (1989).
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Language of fundamental values bypasses our rational minds and goes
directly to our core beliefs. Because of this, the language of natural law
has great symbolic power. It is therefore susceptible both to conscious
misuse by ideologues, and to unwitting misapplication by those mes-
merized by its power, and is as likely to be used as illegitimate propaganda
as it is well-reasoned principles of practical truth.165 In Croson, O'Connor
uses principles of natural law, translated into constitutional terminology,
as propaganda designed to manipulate the algorithms of law in order to "re-
engineer" American society in terms consistent with her flawed vision.
Because American racism has been (and is) so pervasive and enduring,
a rebuttable presumption of racial discrimination is appropriate in many
situations. Rather than impose a specific burden requiring identification
of individual victims and specific violations, a practical understanding of
justice suggests that when there are significant findings of racial dis-
crimination, such as were made by Congress regarding the construction
industry in the United States, a presumption of reasonableness of the
legislative decision is appropriate with a shifting of the burden of proof
to the challenging parties. This type of presumption is in fact nothing
more than the traditional test for review of legislative action. It is also
much more consistent with the standard of review relied on by four mem-
bers of the Court in Bakke and reasserted by Marshall in Croson.
166
Virtually no black American, living or dead, has avoided being dis-
criminated against in some fundamental way simply on the basis of race.
Fewer opportunities, poorer education, reduced access to social goods,
chronic unemployment, a worse quality of life, and similar factors are
consequences that have been imposed on blacks, are still imposed, and
will continue to be imposed for the foreseeable future. The fact that it
has become fashionable among the American Neoconservative movement
to proclaim that racial discrimination is an almost entirely historical
phenomenon does not rewrite reality to make that claim true, any more
than claims that the Nazi Holocaust did not occur alters the terrible
tragedy of that nightmare. Progress has been made for many black cit-
izens, but for many others the situation has become even more bleak.
With the depth, subtlety, and power of American racial attitudes, it is
clear that without affirmative action laws and hiring preferences the
injustice of racial inequality would be even worse than it is at present.
Given the fact that most of the progress for blacks has been generated
by affirmative action measures, availability of government jobs, and spe-
cial educational programs, it is inevitable that a reaction would emerge
among those affected by the measures, as well as those who continue to
possess a deeply ingrained bigotry against blacks.
165 The concepts of justice are hypothetical, and no part of justice is self-
evidently just but may always be called upon to justify itself. The role
of particular, clear, and distinct values, ends, and standards is to guide
and illumine judgment determinately, but in constantly occurring and
important phases of legal judgment, justice is problematic and an
object of search .... By nature, principles of justice are manipulated
rather than followed in reaching decisions.
GARLAN, supra note 51, at 130.
166 See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol38/iss1/5
